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Chapter II 
THE TANKER WAR, 1980-881 
W ith Iran's willingness,2 as of late 1988 and early 1989, to negotiate a ceasefire on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 598,3 an initial 
conclusion might be that the end of hostilities in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war also 
ended US and European security interests in the Persian Gulf. France withdrew 
the aircraft carrier Clemenceau and other naval units in September 1988. The 
United States adopted a more wait -and-see attitude but also began to reduce its na-
val commitment by stopping convoying while remaining in the Gulf to provide a 
"zone defense.,,4 Kuwaiti tankers' "deflagging" began in early 1989,5 and in March 
1990 the last US Navy minesweepers were brought horne. "[R]eturn of the wooden 
ships was in response to a reduced mine threat and will not affect continuing ... op-
erations by US naval vessels aimed at maintaining freedom of navigation and the 
free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf," a press release said in May 1990.6 
Despite these encouraging trends, that war's end did not terminate security in-
terests in the Gulf, particularly for the United States, Western Europe and Japan. 
The war was but a warmer chapter in the struggle of national security interests for 
control or influence in Southwest Asia and petroleum, that region's vital resource. 
The Gulf area has a very large proportion of world oil reserves, about 54-60 per-
cent? Two years later, the 1990-91 Gulf War between Iraq and the Coalition again 
demonstrated the relationship between oil and national security interests.8 
This Chapter begins with an historical overview, followed by analysis of 
great-power involvement, particularly that of the United States, in the Iran-Iraq 
war at policy and strategic levels. 
This work cannot consider in depth other aspects of the war's impact on other 
national security interests-e.g., the USSR incursion into Afghanistan,9 which 
Iraq condemned;10 a Soviet port arrangement with Syria in 1988; Iran-US bilat-
eral relations from the Shah's fall in 1979 through the embassy hostage crisis, 
which Iraq also condemned,l1 to claims in the Iran-Contra Affair; 12 the rise ofIs-
lamic fundamentalism, particularly in Iran; 13 OPEC as an influence; the land war, 
with renewed use of poison gas and missile attacks on cities,14 despite interna-
tionallaw to the contrary; 15 or even an apparent shift in Soviet foreign relations at 
the time16 -all of which (and more) impacted the war and security interests in the 
Gulf. These additional factors are recited, without extended analysis, to confirm 
the point that national security interests in one vital area cannot be seen in a 
vacuum. 
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Part A. Prologue 
There have been many actors17 in the Persian Gulf: France, introduced to the 
Middle East in 1916 afterthe Sykes-Picot agreement, when Syria became a French 
mandate;18 Great Britain, whose influence dates from the early nineteenth cen-
tury; Iraq, independent since 1932 after time as a British mandate and free of Brit-
ish influence since 1954, having been part of the Ottoman Empire before World 
War 1;19 Iran, formerly Persia and more or less independent during the last two 
centuries;20 the United States, whose oil companies have had interests there dur-
ing this century and which assumed the mantle of providing naval security when 
British forces withdrew in 1971; and countries that formed the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) in 1981,21 i.e., Bahrain,22 Kuwait,23 Oman,24 Qatar,25 Saudi 
Arabia26 and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is a federation of the 
former Trucial States-Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras-al-Khaimah, 
Sharjah, Umm-al-Qawain-and came into existence December 1, 1971, when 
Britain left the GulfP Before World War I the Ottoman Empire was sovereign 
over some territories that became the GCC States, e.g., Saudi Arabia, while Britain 
was protector of others, e.g., Kuwait and the Trucial States. 
1. The United Kingdom and France; UK Interventions and Reactions. 
Britain's strategic interests evolved around oil and air routes to India; it dic-
tated defense and foreign relations policy to Iraq and western shore Gulf States, 
later GCC members, except Saudi Arabia, which with Iran were always outside the 
UK orbit. Britain exercised considerable influence over Iran, however.28 In July 
1946, for example,H.M.S. Norfolk and Wild Goose were ordered to Basra, Iraq, after 
the USSR-backed Tudeh Party fomented rioting at the UK-owned oil refinery at 
Abadan, Iran. In August 1946 UK troops landed in Basra. Although intervention 
in Iran was not necessary, the "eventual outcome was satisfactory to British inter-
ests and entailed a setback to the growth of Soviet influence" in Iran.29 On June 26, 
1951 several Royal Navy warships were ordered to Abadan, Iran, to protect British 
subjects during a UK dispute with Iran over nationalization of an oil refinery; 
these ships conducted an evacuation October 3, 1951.30 In 1961 Britain landed 
Royal Marines and troops, with a naval concentration offshore, to help deter an 
Iraqi invasion of newly independent Kuwait. Arab League troops later replaced 
UK ground forces. Still later Iraq recognized Kuwaiti independence.31 For a cen-
tury and a half, the Gulf had been a "British lake," but times were changing.32 
France continued to have close ties with Iraq, however.33 
Evidence of the rise of other forces in the area was demonstrated in 1969 when 
Iranian warships successfully escorted an Iranian merchantman from Khorramshahr 
in the Shatt aI-Arab to the Gulf, defying Iraqi threats to stop any Iran-flagged ves-
sel from sailing through Iraq-claimed waters. In 1961 Iran had bowed to a similar 
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threat, but naval action now secured her purposes.34 As Iran perceived the Soviet 
threat diminishing to her north, she began to focus on her security interests in the 
Gulf.35 Iran began to assert offshore rights to areas where oil reservoirs were 
known to exist and pushed territorial sea claims outward into the Gulf. Eventually 
agreements were reached, except in the upper Gulf, where Irani, Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
claims remained unresolved until 1975.36 After diplomatic interventions in Lon-
don and a plebiscite in Bahrain overwhelmingly rejecting union with Iran, Iran 
dropped sovereignty claims to Bahrain.37 Saudi Arabia has asserted territorial 
claims to parts of Abu Dhabi, a UAE member, and Dhofar, part of Oman, and the 
Khufu strip, disputed with Qatar. Occasionally these disputes would spill over 
into adjacent Gulfwaters, e.g., in 1968 when an Iranian gunboat approached and 
detained an Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) crew on an oil rig 
claimed to be on the Iranian side of waters said to be Iran's for oil exploitation un-
der a Iran-Saudi tentative agreement.38 
2. The United States; Preliminary Gambits in the Gulf. 
US interests began with oil investments in the area, particularly an exclusive 
concession in Saudi Arabia, later shared with the Saudis, that became ARAMCO. 
After World War II US and others' investments gave returns in billions of US dol-
lars annually; US Gulf area concessions stood at half the total of arrangements 
there.39 In the 1970s, however, Saudi Arabia nationalized ARAMCO and other 
foreign holdings. Following on World War II cooperative arrangements, the 
United States built an airfield at Dhahran (1945-62) and homeported its minus-
cule Middle East Force,40 under US Central Command (CENTCOM) during the 
Tanker War, in Bahrain.41 Britain's 1971 withdrawal, while minimal in terms of 
UK security forces and interests, had a profound impact on western Gulf States: 
[UK] withdrawal from the Gulf was more substantial in political terms since it 
necessitated the formulation of an independent political framework for the small 
emirates along the Arab littoral, but the real impact was ... psychological. Britain had 
served as judge, arbiter, administrator, and ... protector of this littoral for well over a 
century. Departure in 1971 was tantamount to removal of the safety net .... 
[C]urrents of nationalist and modernist sentiments and ideas had begun to circulate 
along the shores of the Gulf even before the influx of oil revenues.42 
Some local rulers did not favor UK withdrawal,43 for the obvious reason oflosing 
support,44 and perhaps to fend off neighbors.45 
The United States did not rush into power the vacuum. Reeling from Vietnam 
and responding to a USSR-Iraq friendship treaty,46 the Nixon Administration 
developed the Twin Pillars policy of military assistance to Saudi Arabia and Iran 47 
to protect common regional security interests as part of the Nixon Doctrine. The 
United States would no longer assume direct responsibilitY' for preserving 
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worldwide security but would strengthen regional actors to playa primary role in 
assuring stability. "Benign inaction" characterized US policy, 1971-79.48 The 
United Kingdom saw the Iraq-USSR treaty as more apparent than real, although 
France adhered to a view closer to that of the United States.49 
In the northern Gulf, there was no benign inaction. Iran-Iraq relations were 
strained, 1970-75, but in 1975 treaties to confirm land and water boundaries 
seemed to patch up differences.50 Thus matters stood until Iran's Shah fell in 1979. 
Perhaps an omen for the future had occurred in 1971, the day of British with-
drawal, when Iran occupied Greater and Lesser Tunb islands belonging to the 
UAE's Ras Al Khaimah principality. That same day, pursuant to treaty, part of 
Abu Musa island, belonging to the UAE's Sharjah principality, was given to Iran 
for a military base in return for a grant to the Sharjah ruler. Sharjah and Iran would 
share oil concession revenues. All three islands lie at the mouth of the Gulf, near 
the Strait ofHormuz. Iraq retaliated against Iranian interests, and Libya retaliated 
against Britain, which did not intervene as in 1961.51 
3. The Soviet Union. 
The USSR was seen as "eager to exploit the opportunities created by the ... 
[1980-88] war [when it came] and the perception off altering US interest to insert 
themselves into the Gulf-a region in which their presence [had] traditionally 
been limited and marginal.,,52 A Soviet naval flotilla had been on permanent sta-
tion in the Gulf since March 1968, two months after the UK's notice that it was 
quitting the area.53 The USSR and Iraq had signed a Treaty of Friendship & 
Co-Operation in April 1972, but Soviet relations with Iraq, 1972-80, have been 
characterized as "cordial but far from a patron-client arrangement.,,54 
4. Worldwide Dependence on Persian Gulf Oil and Foreign-Flag Shipping. 
This shift in political balances was accompanied by increasing worldwide de-
pendence on Gulf oil and, for the United States at least, relying on lift of oil in ships 
flying other nations' flags. At the beginning of the Gulf War Europe imported 
about half ofits oil (France, 70 percent; Italy, 60 percent; and other States smaller 
percentages).55 While US 1973-85 Gulf oil import percentages fell through effi-
ciencies, domestic oil production peaked, and by 1985 US oil companies saw the 
United States in a dangerously vulnerable position vis-a-vis OPEC oil. Western 
Europe received 20-40 percent, and Japan about 60 percent, of its oil from the 
Gulf.56 By 1987 US dependence on Gulf oil had doubled from 1985, Western Eu-
rope's consumption of Gulf oil was about 33 percent of its total, Greece's was 50 
percent, and Turkey's and Japan's nearly 66 percent. US domestic oil production 
continued to decline. Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, had tremendous 
advantages in oil reserves and surplus production capacity.57 Saudi oil supplied 
half of France's needs, and other European States had large investments in the 
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country. When the war began Iraq supplied considerably more oil to Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy than Iran.58 Even at war's end, when oil-dependent 
countries had begun to tap other sources, the Gulf supplied a fourth of petroleum 
moving in international commerce. Thirty percent of Western Europe's, and 65 
percent of]apan's, oil came from the Gulf. The United States was 50 percent de-
pendent on foreign oil sources, but only 18 percent of that or 9 percent of total con-
sumption, came from the Gulf. 59 
By 1986, US-flag foreign trade tankers were almost nonexistent; their role had 
been taken by other nations' vessels, particularly those flying flags of convenience 
but often beneficially owned by US business interests. The US foreign trade out-
look was then also poor.60 Contrasted with the US-flag fleet's steady demise and 
growth of flags of convenience, the State-run USSR merchant fleet continued to 
rise. In 1985 its tonnage was well ahead of that of the United States. With Soviet 
satellites and clients counted, the USSR was third in world shipping tonnage (25 
million), behind Liberia, Panama and Greece and ahead of the United King-
dom.61 The Suez Canal closure during the Arab-Israeli wars prompted building 
ever larger tankers, which could be operated more cheaply than smaller ones, but 
which might have greater economic consequences and effects for the environ-
ment, if a ship were damaged or sunk in a grounding or collision, or in a storm. The 
same result would obtain if these huge ships were damaged during armed conflict. 
5. The Environment. 
The environment became another important factor. The UN Environment 
Programme, developed after the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment,62 resulted in many regional treaties, among them the Kuwait Regional 
Convention and Protocol (1978).63 By 1981 it was in force for eight Gulf States, 
Iran and Iraq among them.64 The UN LOS Convention, negotiated during the de-
cade before signature in 1982, restated many principles ofthe 1958 Geneva Con-
ventions on the Law of the Sea, added new terms and published maritime 
environmental standards. The Gulf is particularly environmentally sensitive be-
cause of heavy tanker traffic and offshore petroleum production activity. The 
Gulfs currents are slow, there is only a gradual exchange of water, and therefore 
little purgation of pollution once it happens.65 
6. Geography of the Persian Gulf. 
The Persian Gulf, known as the Arabian Gulf to Gulf coastal States, is a shallow 
extension of the Indian Ocean between the Arabian Peninsula to the west and Iran 
to the east. It extends northeast 614 miles from the Gulf of Oman in the Indian 
Ocean, through the Strait ofHormuz to the Shatt aI-Arab in the north. Iran bor-
ders it on the northeastern shore; Iran, Iraq (which has only a 10-mile coastline) 
and Kuwait are on its northwest shores, and the island State of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
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Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE border the Gulf on its southwestern shore and 
around Oman's Musandam Peninsula to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. 
The Gulfis 24 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point in the Strait and about 200 
miles across at its widest point. Like the Baltic and Black Seas the Gulf is shallow 
with an average depth of 130-260 feet, with greatest depths of 700 feet within 
Omani territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. There is no deep seabed in the 
Gulf, whether considered from a geographic or law of the sea analysis. The shal-
lowest areas, less than 120 feet, are along the UAE, where vessels over 5000 tons 
displacement, i.e., nearly all of to day's tankers,66 can safely sail no closer than five 
miles offshore. The Strait, only about 24 miles wide at its narrowest point, is rela-
tively deep (210-270 feet) in its navigational channels. However, the Strait is dot-
ted with islands claimed by littoral countries, Qeshen (Iran), Larak (Iran) and 
Quoin Islands (Oman) at its narrowest point, and Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser 
Tunbs, occupied by Iran.67 Bahrain is an island nation, and there are other off-
shore islands around the Gulf, e.g., Bubiyan (Kuwait) and Kharg (Iran). Several 
Gulf States, e.g., Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have numerous offshore 
oil rigs or pumping stations. At the head of the Gulf, the Shatt aI-Arab (formed by 
confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers) flows through a marshy delta into 
the Gulf. There are also shallow estuaries elsewhere along the Gulf, where a pearl 
industry flourished for centuries.68 The Shatt has been a boundary, albeit dis-
puted, between Iran and Iraq. Kuwait lies just around the corner of the Gulf from 
the Shatt marshes and Iran and Iraq. Like the Baltic and Black Seas, there is rela-
tively little outflow or inflow from or to the Gulf. It is not as stagnant as the Black 
Sea, but a pollution problem in the Gulf, whether deliberate, e.g., petroleum dump-
ing during war or a terrorist attack, or accidental, e.g., in collisions or during war, 
can have longterm consequences for the Gulf environment, not to mention free-
dom ofnavigation.69 
7. Vital Shipping Chokepoints. 
Yet another, and critically enduring, factor is that waters enclosing the Arabian 
Peninsula have three of the world's most economically and strategically important 
waterways: the Strait of Hormuz, entry for the Gulf; the Suez Canal and Bab EI 
Mandeb Strait, entries and exits for the Red Sea, through which 10 percent of 
world commerce flows. Suez and Bab EI Mandeb cut transit time dramatically for 
merchantmen or naval forces moving between the Mediterranean Sea and the In-
dian Ocean; 70 closing the Canal during the Arab-Israeli wars forced travel around 
Africa and promoted building larger petroleum tankers to supply the world. "The 
... Gulf ... with the Strait of Hormuz, which gives access to it from the Gulf of 
Oman and the Indian Ocean, might well be described as an international oil high-
way,,71 or "the West's lifeline," and a collision or terrorist attack in the Strait could 
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have serious consequences.72 More than 80 tankers passed through Hormuz 
daily.73 The number is less today. 
Part B. The Course of the War and Others' Responses 
The precipitating event for US involvement in the 1980-88 Gulf War was the 
USSR invasion of Afghanistan and danger to the Gulfbecause of a power vacuum 
there.74 US President Jimmy Carter's January 23, 1980 State of the Union Address 
treated the Gulf area as a vital American interest; he said the United States would 
respond with force if necessary: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the ... Gulfregion will be regarded as an as-
sault on the vital interests of the United States .. , and such an assault will be re-
pelled by any means necessary, including military force.,,75 US naval task forces 
were already in the Indian Ocean because of the Hostage Crisis; 76 they remained 
there. The Carter Doctrine, as this point in the Address came to be called, pro-
moted a basic rationale for prepositioning ships with stores for the Rapid De-
ployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at Diego Garcia, a British Indian Ocean 
dependency, and preparing for possible RDJTF deployment.77 RDJTF was not 
then a strong or mobile enough force to make it a serious US policy instrument,18 
although its "jurisdiction" stretched over 19 countries, from Pakistan to Egypt to 
Kenya, an area twice as large as the continental United States with nearly impossi-
ble lines of communication and some of the most inhospitable terrain on Earth.19 
The other, unstated goal was protecting Saudi Arabia. The United States would re-
spond "positively" to requests for assistance from "non-belligerent friends" in the 
region.80 
Activist Iraqi Muslim Shiites, the dominant sect in Iran, tried to assassinate 
Iraq's deputy premier in April 1980. Iraq began rooting out these activists, bombed 
an Iranian border town, expelled Iranian residents and Iraqis ofIranian descent, 
and called on Iran to vacate Abu Musa, Lesser and Greater Tunb, occupied by Iran 
and formerly UAE territory. Iran began training infiltrators, and Iraq supported 
important members of the Shah's government resident in Baghdad, who tried to 
topple the Iranian government. Iraq sought and received backing from Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia, fearful ofIranian antimonarchial policy; according to Iran, Ku-
wait and Saudi Arabia signed secret agreements on September 12 to boost oil out-
puts considerably and to contribute sales revenues to Iraq's war effort. (Saudi 
Arabia had signed an agreement with Iraq in February 1979, reportedly including 
mutual security arrangements.) After border clashes in the summer of 1980, Iran 
began shelling Iraqi towns in early September. Iraq demanded territorial cessions, 
purportedly part of the 1975 settlement.81 
40 The Tanker War 
1. 1980: Opening Moves; First Efforts at Ending the War. 
On September 22 Iraq invaded Iran.82 Two days later Jordan offered Iraq total 
support, including arms bought from the USSR and Western powers. Jordan also 
gave Iraq access to the Port of Aqaba and land and air facilities for imports and ex-
ports.83 The war had begun.84 
On September 21 and 24 Iraq declared the 1975 agreement demarcating the 
Shatt abrogated,85 asserting it would exercise full sovereignty over the Shatt.86 
Iraq required Iranian ships using the Shatt to engage Iraqi pilots and fly the Iraqi 
ensign at the truck. Iran refused to do this.87 When Iraq had invaded Iran on Sep-
tember 22 claiming self-defense,88 an Iranian Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR) de-
clared waterways near its coast a war zone, announced new shipping lanes after 
ships passed Hormuz, disclaimed responsibility if vessels did not follow the lanes, 
refused access to Iraqi ports, thereby closing the Shatt,89 and warned of retaliation 
if Gulf States gave Iraq facilities.90 Refusal of access to Iraqi ports was later charac-
terized as a "blockade" of the Iraqi coast.91 There were also sporadic attacks on 
shipping in the Shatt in the early days of the war.92 Whetherthis resulted in pollu-
tion into the Gulf cannot be determined; undoubtedly there was spillage from 
bunkers, tankers and damaged facilities. Attacking States' motivation and care, in 
terms of concerns, if any, for the environment is not known. 
On September 23 the European Community (EC) endorsed an Arab League ap-
peal for a ceasefire and "emphasize[ d] the vital importance for the entire interna-
tional community offreedom of navigation in the Gulf, with which it is imperative 
not to interfere.,,93 From the beginning of the war until near the end, however, the 
EC made no effort to harmonize policy, due to lack of internal cohesion and a clash 
of cultnres.94 Several Arab States, Libya and Syria among them, had supported 
Iran in the League; Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation and South Yemen had boycotted the meeting.95 Five days later the UN Se-
curity Council's Resolution 479 called for ending hostilities.96 Iraq, denying 
territorial ambitions, accepted the Resolution; Iran considered the 1975 treaty 
valid and demanded condemnation ofIraqi aggression.97 Although the resolution 
had not mentioned freedom of navigation, Japan and the United States stressed 
that principle's primary importance.98 Resolution 479 also supported the UN Sec-
retary-General's efforts to settle the dispute through mediation or conciliation, 
and in November he appointed former Swedish Prime Minister OlafPalme as me-
diator; Palme's efforts were largely unsuccessfu1.99 
On October 1 Iran declared the Shatt closed for all maritime craft until further 
notice.100 On October 5 a US NOTMAR announced Iran had warned that "all 
coastal waters [were] battle areas. All transportation of materials to Iraqi ports 
[was] prohibited." After passing Hormuz, merchant traffic should stay south of 
designated points. The Shatt estuary should be avoided, and mariners were cau-
tioned to be alert to unusual, abnormal or hostile actions while in the Gulf.101 
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Iran's rationale for its war zone declaration was twofold, "the first being of a de-
fensive nature .... Iran was [concerned with] protect[ing] its coastline against in-
trusion by ships likely to present a risk to national security .... [F]oreign ships 
wishing to pass through the zone had to request prior authorization .... Ships call-
ing at a port in ... [a] countr[y] bordering the ... Gulfwere, for obvious security 
reasons, subject to stricter regulations," being required to contact Iran's naval 
headquarters 48 hours in advance. "Iran's second concern was to guarantee the 
safety of international shipping .... [T]he zone could be dangerous to shipping due 
to warlike events likely to take place there. Without going so far as forbidding ac-
cess to the zone, Iran ... recommend foreign ships to avoid the zone by following 
shipping lanes outside it, thereby disclaiming responsibility for any damage 
which might be incurred on passing through the zone. Thus warned ... , ships 
which persisted ... did so attheir own risk.,,102 Iran began shuttling merchant con-
voys under naval protection down her coast, through Iraq's Gulf Maritime Exclu-
sion Zone (GMEZ), to the lower Gulf. l03 According to an Iranian commentator, 
"contrary to allegations, Iran never extended its war zone to ... Hormuz and, on 22 
October ... , reaffirmed a commitment to keeping the Strait open to naviga-
tion.,,104 The United States later welcomed belligerents' assurances that Hormuz 
would remain open. !Os Despite lapses in its threats to close the Strait,106 or its ap-
parent use of others' territorial sea for naval maneuvers,107 there is clear evidence 
to the contrary of a commentator's view that Iran's position in the Third UN Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) that produced the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion "remained faithful to monarchical Iran's worldview regarding the navigation 
regime of the Gulf, most notably, opposition of a special regime for straits used for 
international navigation ... , as well as insistence on prior authorization of war-
ships intending to exercise innocent passage through the territorial sea.,,108 
On October 7 Iraq declared the Gulf north of29 degrees 30 minutes North lati-
tude "a prohibited war zone;" this was the Tanker War arena until 1984.!09 This 
war zone declaration was reportedly reprisal, or retaliation, for the Iranian "block-
ade.,,110 By far the most severe blow to the Iraqi economy was Iran's successful clo-
sure of the Gulf, soon after hostilities began, to Iraqi oil exports. 1 1 1 Closing Iraq's 
coast and Iranian bombing ofIraqi oil terminals forced Iraq to use pipelines to Ku-
waiti, Saudi, Syrian and Turkish ports to export oil to finance the war, or to export 
or import war-sustaining goods by other means, i.e., nearby third-State ports. The 
result was that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia sold oil and turned over at least part of the 
proceeds to Iraq as loans. They also made cash grants to Iraq.ll2 Estimates of Saudi 
and Kuwaiti financial aid range from $25 billion to $65 billion.ll3 Although hav-
ing sided with Iran early in the war, Syria allowed Iraqi oil exports through the 
Kirkuk (Iraq)-Tripoli (Lebanon)-Banias (Syria) pipeline until 1982.114 During 
the fall, "as reprisal for Kuwaiti assistance to Iraq," Iranian warplanes attacked 
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Kuwaiti border posts and bombed the Um-Aish oil refineries, 25 miles below the 
Iraqi border.us 
Whether these were arms-length bargains, or these States acted out of fear of a 
powerful neighbor, or otherwise, is less than clear.116 Bahrain, Qatar and the U AE 
maintained strict official silence, although two UAE principalities (including Ras 
Al Khaimah, which lost islands to Iran in 1971p710aned Iraq $1-3 billion by the 
end ofl981, Abu Dhabi loaned $500 million a year by 1983, and Qatar loaned an-
other $1 billion.11s UK intelligence discovered Iraqi helicopters and troops in 
Oman preparing to invade and occupy Abu Musa and the Tunbs; the UK and US 
governments successfully pressed Oman to scuttle the Iraqi plan. Later, Saudi 
Arabia persuaded Iraq to abandon the plan.119 Thus, at the beginning ofthe war 
nearly all Gulflittoral States supported, or at least tilted toward, Iraq. Jordan had 
solidly supported Iraq, opening the Port of Aqaba on the Red Sea for Iraqi civilian 
and military imports. According to Iran, Jordan also permitted Iraqi use of an air 
base.120 This support was probably necessary for survival of the Iraqi regime, be-
cause Iranian bombardment ofIraqi Gulf ports early in the war made Iraq effec-
tivelya landlocked country. By the end of 1980 its oil exports had dwindled from 
over 3 million to 1 million barrels a day.121 Although officially neutral, Turkey 
leaned toward Iraq.122 Nevertheless, perhaps 10 percent of Turkey's exports went 
to Iran during the war and another 10 percent to Iraq.123 Egypt sold weapons to 
Iraq and may have augmented the Iraqi army with mercenaries and volunteer de-
tachments. Egyptian pilots took part in air raids on Iran.124 
Officially neutral, the United Kingdom improved relations with Iraq. France 
was also neutral, but its policies favored Iraq.12S Private contractors in both coun-
tries signed deals with Iraq, and other States' arms dealers went through Iraq's oil 
customers to supply Iraq arms and spares.126 At the beginning of the war the 
United States did not have diplomatic relations with either belligerent; US rela-
tions with Iran were bad because of the ongoing Hostage Crisis. On the other hand, 
the USSR had relations with both and was in a less strained position with respect to 
Iran, for which there had been historic Russian interest. Soviet aid to Iran stood at 
$1 billion in 1980.127 By the end of the war the USSR had provided $8.8 to 9.2 bil-
lion in military assistance, most of it coming through Aqaba.12S The initial Soviet 
response to the invasion was strong disapproval, despite the 1972 Iraq-USSR 
friendship treaty, and may have resulted in beginning Iraqi overtures to the 
United States.129 Italy's previously solid economic relations with Iraq were put 
under pressure when it declared neutrality; Italy'S Fincantieri shipyard could not 
then deliver 11 warships Iraq ordered as part of a $1.1 billion contract. Italian ex-
port licenses granted in 1981 lapsed because of the government's decision to ban 
military exports to the belligerents. Iraq then refused to pay on its $2 billion debt to 
Italy. Italian companies and Italian nationals also worked on Iranian construction 
projects; this kept Italy from a high diplomatic profile. Italian businesses operated 
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with both belligerents. The FRG maintained a more evenhanded approach. 
Smaller northern European States not dependent on Gulf oil looked to the United 
Nations to resolve the war. Spain and Greece, Gulfoil dependent, got all of it they 
neededYO 
The Islamic revolution left Iran in poor financial condition. As more skilled, 
better educated and wealthy people fled, oil production declined, and foreign ex-
change reserves dwindled from $14.6 billion in 1979 to $1 billion in 1981.131 How-
ever, Iran had military spare parts reserves, a legacy of the Shah's rule; 132 these 
supplied its war machine for awhile. Syria and Libya supported Iran, airlifting 
USSR-made arms to Iran; Syria provided intelligence.133 Some private arms deal-
ers in States officially leaning toward Iraq sold supplies to Iran.134 Israel sold Iran 
arms and spares from its stocks and got others from European sources. North Ko-
rea, East Germany and Cuba, eager to buy oil, sold Iran military supplies.135 The 
USSR, officially linked closely with Iraq, 136 may have sold war goods to Iran as 
well, but Iraqi reverses in 1982 prompted promises of Soviet aid to Iraq.137 The 
USSR was caught among three conflicting foreign policy issues: its relationship 
with Iraq, an official amicable stance toward the Iranian revolution, and an inter-
national atmosphere marred by the Afghanistan invasion and tense US-Iran rela-
tions after the Hostage Crisis. The Soviet Union had declared its neutrality early in 
the war, however.138 The USSR appeared dissatisfied with Iraqi military action in 
late 1980, and flirted with Iran and its friends, inter alia signing a Friendship 
Treaty with Syria in October. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not totally aban-
don Iraq. Iraq, perhaps petulently, rejected arms from the USSR this time. Warsaw 
Pact countries-Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland-increased arms sales to Iraq. 
Early in the war Iran rebuffed a Soviet arms offer. Iran did get satellite information 
on impending Iraqi attacks, however.139 Iran was determined to be militarily 
self-sufficient as part of the Islamic revolution. Iraq, on the other hand, relied in-
creasinglyon Gulf State financial subventions, up to $18-20 billion by the end of 
1981. Iraq also came to rely on the superpowers diplomatically too.140 
In November Iranian NOTMARs directed ships entering or leaving Iranian 
ports to get coordinates for Gulf travel from its navy and to inform the relevant Ira-
nian port of their position hourly. Inbound ships had to give estimated time of ar-
rival at Bandar Abbas and be cleared. If not cleared, they were to anchor there. 
Early in 1981 a NOTMAR directed all very large crude carriers or ultra large crude 
carriers (VLCC or ULCC), not inbound for Iranian ports and intending to cross 
the Iranian restricted zone, to contact Iranian naval headquarters with travel in-
formation 48 hours before departure,141 ostensibly for ship safety reasons.142 
"Although neither Iran nor Iraq declared contraband lists, the fact that both na-
tions attacked neutral crude oil carriers, loaded and in ballast, indicated both ... 
regarded oil as contraband. Whether classified as absolute or conditional contra-
band, oil and the armaments which its sale or barter on international markets 
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[would] bring, were absolutely indispensable to the war efforts of the ... bellig-
erents.,,143 No prize courts were established until the end of the war, when Iran 
published its rules, which did not include a contraband list. l44 
The UK Armilla Patrol was deployed in the Gulffrom the beginning;14S Gulf 
States provided it and other western navies facilities. 146 Logistics sources limited 
Patrol operations to the lower Gulf, up to 40 miles north of Dub ai, and outside war 
zones; UK merchantmen steaming to Kuwait were not protected northward. 147 A 
US guided missile cruiser was ordered to the Gulf in October; President Carter 
wanted a naval task force presence to keep Hormuz open.148 By October IS at least 
60 Australian, French, UK and US warships were in the Indian Ocean to protect 
the oil route; 29 Soviet vessels were also there.149 US overall policy had these 
themes: 
(1) United States neutrality ... 
(2) American expectation of neutrality and non-interference by other nations; 
particularly the U.S.S.R. 
(3) Defense of United States vital interests including: 
(a) Preservation offreedom of navigation to and from the Gulf, 
(b) Prevention of the war's expansion in ways that would threaten the re-
gion's security. 
(4) A desire for the immediate cessation of hostilities and solution of the dispute 
by diplomatic means. 
These derived from US goals of peace and preventing a wider war. lSO The United 
States had imposed economic sanctions on Iran when the Hostage Crisis began. 
Some controls were revoked in 1981 after the hostages' return, others remained in 
force, and more controls were imposed again in 1987 because of Iran's actions 
against US flag vessels in the Gulf. lSl The United Kingdom had passed special leg-
islation to permit Orders in Council to limit contracts related to Iran in early 1980, 
and this legislation also remained in effect during the war. lS2 
When the war began 70 neutral-flag vessels were trapped in the Shatto Despite 
UN good offices in October 1980, including a plea for a ceasefire to allow them to 
leave under a UNIS30r Red Cross flag,lS4 Iraq refused to allow it, citing its "full" 
sovereignty over the Shatt.lSS Iran had accepted the proposal.lS6 The ships re-
mained in the waterway for the rest of the war. 
2. 1981: Efforts at Settlement; the Gulf States Organize the GCC. 
In March 1981 the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) offered the bellig-
erents a peace plan; they rejected it. lS7 UN mediation, which had begun in No-
vember, had failed by April. lS8 
Between May and November 1981 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE established the Gulf Cooperation Council under Saudi leadership with 
French and UK advice, to effect coordination, integration and interconnection 
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between member States to achieve unity among them. GCC members moved to-
ward economic integration and defense and security coordination between 1981 
and the end of the war.159 The Council initially stressed economic and social plan-
ning, as is evident from its Charter, but security issues eventually emerged as the 
GCC's primary focus. 160 The Council "consistently supported Iraq and repeatedly 
called for cease-fire in the war, fully endorsing Security Council resolutions.,,161 
Although the GCC tried to underline its neutrality, Iran may have seen its estab-
lishment as a step against it and the Islamic revolution.162 However, one member, 
UAE, pursued its special relationship with Iran; the GCC secretariat approved it to 
maintain open, friendly communication with Iran. Even here there was ambiva-
lence because of Iran's occupying Abu Musa and the Tunbs.163 Similarly, al-
though basically supporting Iraq, Kuwait felt pressure from Iran because of its 
geographic proximity.164 
Militarily, the GCe was weak, relative to the belligerents, except the Saudi air 
force; the other five States mustered only 100,000 in their armed forces. 165 The 
GCC was never totally unified, at least early in the war. For example, Qatar, be-
cause of a Saudi-Qatar dispute over the Khufu strip, withdrew forces from Penin-
sula Shield I, the first relatively modest GCC combined exercise. This action, 
according to an Iranian commentator, reportedly "followed a succession of other 
blows to attempts at constructing a common defense arrangement.,,166 Later Pen-
insula Shields (II, 1984; III, 1987), were more successful. For the first time in the 
Twentieth Century, forces from all GCe States participated in cooperative mili-
tary activities aimed at defending their territories. Although the war initially 
posed a threat to GCe States, the end result was a stronger, more unified military 
structure. In 1984 its Council decided on a rapid intervention force for peacekeep-
ing operations in the Gulf area; in 1987 the Council approved a comprehensive se-
curity strategy, which may amount to a collective defense pact.167 Nevertheless, 
most Western analysts concluded during the war's early years that the narrow 
military significance of any GCC measures would remain marginal. Council mem-
bers, even if they acted in unison, were seen as lacking manpower and infrastruc-
ture to mount an adequate defense against a determined aggressor. Although the 
GCC States could not stop a Soviet attack, they could increase the political and mil-
itary costs of aggressive moves by regional States, e.g., Iran or Iraq, and thereby 
serve as a deterrent.168 GCC States also negotiated a web of bilateral internal secu-
rity arrangements to combat subversion and terrorism.169 The May 1981 GCC 
summit in Abu Dhabi declared that the Gulf should remain free of international 
conflicts and expressed fear offoreign intervention. Its November Riyadah confer-
ence expressed hope that efforts coming from the ICO, non-aligned States, and the 
U nited Nations, would be successful. Thus the GCC came to emphasize the ICO as 
a mediator between the belligerents.170 Thus, early in the war, the GCC's signifi-
cance and the emerging regional security framework was seen 
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as an information-sharing network for ... contain[ing] ... internal subversion and 
violence; as a wholly indigenous and domestically palatable framework for serious 
and routine consultation with a view toward enhancing members' diplomatic 
initiatives and deterrent capabilities against external aggression; and as a possible 
venue for establishing more realistic, efficient, and compatible industrial plans in an 
era of reduced income. 
Much would depend on events in Iran and Iraq, however. I7l 
Also in 1981, at Saudi request, US Air Force AWACS aircraft deployed to Saudi 
Arabia to enhance surveillance capabilities. In The incoming Reagan Administra-
tion saw the USSR as the major threat in the Gulf, a purported shift in US pol-
icy.I73 On Saudi advice, the Administration sent a special emissary to Baghdad in 
April 1981, and Iraq announced in July that the head of the US interests section 
would be treated as a de facto ambassador.I74 US military presence was to be in-
creased, including assets prepositioning a Navy-Marine Corps task force, Army 
and Air Force exercises, creation of the RDJTF, and efforts to get access to Indian 
Ocean facilities. I75 A May 27 US NOTMAR repeated previous warnings and 
Iran's revised shipping guidelines.I76 
In May 1981 Iran seized a Kuwaiti survey ship and a Danish vessel, Elsa Cat, 
bound for the UAE and Kuwait and carrying military equipment to Iraq; Iraq 
protested Elsa Cat's seizure. Both vessels were let go. Iran was careful at this time to 
avoid provoking neighbors or major Western powers, being dependent on trans-
shipments from the UAE and food imports through the Gulf. I77 In October an Ira-
nian air raid damaged Kuwaiti Umm Aish oil installations. Beginning in 1981 and 
continuing through 1984, Iraq attacked commmercial vessels in the northern 
Gulf, usually tankers and cargo ships calling at Bandar Khomeni or Bushire, Iran 
after being convoyed through Iranian territorial waters. I7S In March 1982 it was 
reported that Iraq had mined the Bandar Khomeni -port of Ban dar Mashahr chan-
nel to the open sea. An Iranian tanker had been lost in February, probably to 
mines. I79 There are apparently no published reports of oil spillage and pollution, 
or pollution from other cargoes or bunkers from these or later attacks, except for 
the 1983 Nowruz attack. ISO However, it is safe to infer that there was spillage and 
therefore pollution of harbors and offshore sea areas; the extent is unknown. The 
minelayers' motivation and care in conducting these and later attacks is also un-
known. In April 1982 Syria had shut off Iraq's oil pipeline access to the Mediterra-
nean; Iraq could now only export oil through Saudi Arabia and a trans-Turkey 
pipeline. lSI In 1984 the Turkish line was expanded; in 1987 a second leg was built. 
Oil was also trucked across Jordan to the Port of Aqaba. This network, which 
included a spur pipeline to Yanbu in Saudi Arabia, increased Iraqi export capacity 
from 650,000 barrels a day in 1982, the low point during the war, to 2.5 million 
barrels a day in 1987, or close to prewar output. IS2 Iran also realized the danger of 
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lifting its oil through Gulf ports and planned a 1200-kilometer pipeline to J ask in 
the Indian Ocean.I83 
3. 1982: More Efforts at Peacemaking; Iraq's Maritime Exclusion Zone. 
In May 1982 Iraq tried to invoke the Arab League mutual defense treaty to get 
military aid from League members. Syria warned that if Egypt, a League member, 
lined up with Iraq, Syria would go with Iran. The result was a political standoff. 184 
Algerian attempts to mediate the dispute almost resulted in a breakthrough. I8S 
The Gulf Cooperation Council's emergency meeting in April had declared support 
for efforts to end the war, and its May emergency meeting had adjourned until May 
30 to allow efforts, including those of the ICO, to end the war. When this effort col-
lapsed, the GCC called on Iran to respond positively to Iraq's peace initiatives. For 
the first time, the Council identified Iran as the intransigent party. The GCC re-
peated this call in July 1982. This year marked the GCC's awakening to shoulder-
ing its security responsibilities more forcefully. GCC defense ministers authorized 
comprehensive cooperation in security affairs.I86 Peninsula Shield II was held in 
1984, a result of these decisions. I87 
InJ une 1982 the GCC had offered a peace plan: ceasefire, withdrawal to the 1975 
borders and negotiations on other issues. I88 In July and October Security Council 
Resolutions 514 and 522 called for a ceasefire.I89 The UN Secretary-General re-
ported Iraq was ready to cooperate in implementing Resolution 514, which also 
called for UN observers to supervise a ceasefire and withdrawal.I90 Iran was not; 
the next day a uly 13, 1982) Iran launched the first of many offensives into Iraq, the 
first real invasion of its adversary. 191 In September the Arab League urged ending 
the war and complying with Council resolutions.I92 Iraq subscribed to this peace 
plan, sponsored by Saudi Arabia; Iran rejected it,I93 demanding $150 billion in in-
demnity.I94 Even Saudi Arabia's private offer to pay $50 billion to Iran in indem-
nity was refused. I9S Israel's invading Lebanon in June also helped blow these 
efforts off course. By late 1982 all Gulf States had policies of strict neutrality be-
cause of fear ofIran except Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which strongly favored Iraq. 
Kuwait was fearful of its northern neighbor as well; Iraq continued to demand a 
lease of Kuwait's Bubiyan Island at the Shatt's mouth. Saudi Arabia agreed to pay 
for five Super Etendard fighters, sold by France to Iraq, in Saudi oil money. Ku-
wait and Saudi Arabia also guaranteed performance offoreign companies' defense 
contracts with Iraq.I96 Observers claim Iraq could not have sustained its war effort 
without the French deliveries.I97 The United States authorized sale of60 helicop-
ters for "agricultural purposes" and $460 million of credits for American rice.198 
On August 12, 1982 Iraq had announced its GMEZ, advising it would attack any 
ship within the zone and that tankers docking at Iran's Kharg Island, regardless of 
nationality, would be targets. Khargwas Iran's main export terminal.I99 When an-
nouncing the GMEZ and "blockade" of Kharg, Iraq stressed that its war zones 
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were designed to cope with difficulties in distinguishing between vessel nationali-
ties in the Gulf.200 On August 29 Iran responded, declaring it would protect 
foreign shipping, began escorting foreigr. shipping, and deployed ships with sur-
face-to-air missiles at Kharg. Iran began giving naval protection to shuttle convoys 
of Iran-flagged and neutral flag merchantmen lifting oil from Iranian northern 
Gulf ports to those farther down its shore for world export. Iraq attacked ships in 
its GMEZ through September. The GMEZ was modified in November, Iraq 
"ask[ing] all companies and owners of oil tankers that their vessels [would] be sub-
ject to danger upon entering the ... zone.,,201 In general, however, up to March 
1984, Iraq attacked all ships in its GMEZ.202 This aspect of the war was the only 
theater where the initiative lay with Iraq.203 The US freedom of navigation policy 
was redefined to keeping Gulf access open for nonbelligerents.204 Contacts with 
the United States increased, and in 1982 the United States removed Iraq from its 
list of States supporting international terrorism,205 thereby opening a door for 
more Iraq-US contacts, e.g., intelligence information and business.206 The USSR 
by now had receded from its initial disapproval ofIraq's invasion and began to in-
crease supplies to Iraq, to the point where the Soviet Union underwrote most of 
Iraq's 1987 defense effort. The USSR was primarily concerned with Iraq's sur-
vival; an Iranian military victory was not considered to be in the Soviet Union's 
best interests.207 
The November 1982 Bahrain Gulf Cooperation Council summit focused on Ira-
nian complicity in a failed coup in Bahrain, and "More than any other event, [it] 
molded the GCC's view on how to react toward Iran." Although Saudi Arabia 
failed to convince GCC members to help Iraq financially, it succeeded in identify-
ing the Iranian Islamic Revolution as a threat to the GCC. After the summit GCC 
defense ministers and others conferred to coordinate contingency plans for con-
taining the war, i.e., to prevent spillover into theirterritories. These officials asked 
Iran to respond to the ICO, UN and other peace missions; there was no response. 
Given these rejections, the GCC decided to officially support Iraq.208 In January 
1983 Iran, Libya and Syria issued a "Damascus Communique," condemning Iraq 
and expressing support for Iran. GCC foreign ministers sent a strong rebuke, say-
ing the Communique did not serve Arab unity and would not help end the war. 
The 1983 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit urged a ceasefire appealing to 
the United Nations to consider a peacekeeping force at the belligerents' bor-
ders.209 
4.1983: Assault on the Environment; The UN Supports Freedom o/Navigation. 
On March 2,1983 Iraq bombed Iran's Nowruz offshore oilfield, causing an im-
mense slick; previously it had bombed Kharg facilities. 
Efforts to arrange a cease-fire ... to allow anti-pollution activities were unsuccessful, 
and the persistent oil slick in a level of pollution which some experts believed would 
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cause permanent damage to the Gulf ecosystem; ... by early June ... desalination 
plants in Saudi Arabia had to be closed, while Dubai [one of the UAE] announced on 
3 June that it had [imposed a ban] on all imports of fish from neighbouring Gulf 
countries after the discovery that existing stocks had been contaminated by oil. 
In some areas the oil was reportedly two feet thick. International shipping lanes 
were threatened, since many vessels use sea water for cooling and distilling into 
fresh water. Early reports that the slick had equalled the area of Belgium were later 
discounted. Strong winds blew it offshore and partially dispersed it. Iraq rejected 
Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil cappers could try to stop the 2000 to 5000 
barrels a day flow.210 (A merchantman's allision with a well on January 27 had 
caused part of the spill.211) The United States may have been involved in helping 
get the spill capped.212 Iran characterized the attack as a clear violation of the Ku-
wait Regional Convention organization regulations which "strictly prohibit[ed] 
military attacks on oil installations.,,213 Iraq countered that the conventions 
"ha[d] no effect in ... armed conflict.,,214 The London-based War Risks Rating 
Committee raised marine cargo insurance rates in 1982 and again in 1984 because 
of Iraqi attacks on Gulfshipping.2IS 
In October the Security Council called for a ceasefire. Resolution 540 "Con-
demn[ed] all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular ... the 
Geneva Conventions ofl949 in all their aspects, and call [ ed] for the immediate ces-
sation of all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residen-
tial areas[.]" The Resolution 
..• Affirm [ed] the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, 
call[ed] on all States to respect this right and also call[ed] upon the belligerents to 
cease immediately all hostilities in the region of the Gulf, including all sea-lanes, 
navigable watenvays, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports 
with direct or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity of the other 
littoral States. 
The Council "Call[ed] upon both parties to refrain from any action that may endan-
ger peace and security as well as marine life in the region of the Gulf.,,216 In voting 
to approve Resolution 540, the USSR made it clear that it would firmly oppose 
armed intervention in the Gulf for any reason, including freedom of navigation. 217 
The Gulf Cooperation Council's fourth summit endorsed the resolution. The GCC 
thus went on record, for the first time, to support freedom of navigation in the 
Gulf.2IS 
On January 1, 1983 the US Central Command (CENTCOM) had been estab-
lished to replace the RDJTF to plan and coordinate US military operations in the 
region more effectively. France and Britain continued to maintain a substantial 
Indian Ocean naval presence, with ships regularly sent there.219 The USSR also 
continued its Indian Ocean presence. President Reagan had reaffirmed and 
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expanded the Carter Doctrine to include US interest in dealing with threats to 
Saudi Arabia and readiness to keep the Strait open ifIran tried to stop shipping 
there. US buildup continued.220 Operation Staunch sought to curtail the arms 
flow to Iran.221 US policy had changed in late 1983, following Iraqi officials' visit 
to Washington, where they advised the United States that closing the Gulf to Iraqi 
oil exports had hurt the Iraqi economy and that Iraq would have to increase the 
cost of the war to Iran in order to press Iran to end it.222 In December 1983 Iran 
sought to revive the Regional Cooperation for Development Agreement with Paki-
stan and Turkey that the Shah had established in the 1960s. Pakistan and Turkey 
received the overture cordially.223 
5.1984: Attacks on Tankers and Other Shipping; Responses. 
Perhaps presciently, the United States published this Notice to Airmen 
(NOTAM) and NOTMARin January 1984: 
A. u.s. naval forces operating in international waters within the ... Gulf, Strait of 
Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman are taking additional defensive precautions against 
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL [above ground level] ... 
not cleared for approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid 
approaching closer than five NM [nautical miles] to U.S. naval forces. It is also 
requested that aircraft approaching within five NM establish and maintain radio 
contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies]. Aircraft which approach 
within five NM at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL whose intentions are unclear to 
U.S. naval forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive measures. 
B. This notice is published solely to advise that hazardous operations are being 
conducted on an unscheduled basis; it does not affect the freedom of navigation of 
any individual or State .... 224 
Iran protested this and later "cordon sanitaires,,225 around US warships and air-
craft, and US Navy ships transiting Iran's territorial sea during the war.226 The 
United States rejected the protests, asserting a right of self-defense.227 These 
claims were seen as a hardening of positions between Iran and the United States. 
The US official position was that Iran was refusing to end the war, and not Iraq, 
which had accepted Resolution 540, and that Iraq attacked shipping in its GMEZ, 
while Iran was hitting neutral vessels in international waters. By now 19 US war-
ships, including a carrier, were in the Gulfarea.228 Britain decided not to use an en-
velope around its Armilla Patro1.229 
In March 1984 the United States reportedly tried to persuade some Gulf States 
to avoid a crisis by letting the United States use their military facilities and to allow 
military supplies prepositioning in Bahrain, Oman and the UAE. The United 
States had coordinated contingency plans with Great Britain for escorting tankers 
and providing air cover in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. US plans also 
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reportedly included blockading Kharg Island, mining Iranian Gulf ports and 
commando raids on Iranian bases. However, the United States insisted that it be 
invited into the region and that any arrangement must involve Western allies. The 
mission came to naught.230 Part of the background for the US initiative may have 
been Kuwait's claim that Iran had attacked Bubiyan Island, owned by Kuwait, and 
Kuwait's complaint ofIranian hospitality to terrorists who hijacked a Kuwaiti air-
liner and escaped to Iran.231 
In February 1984 the Iraqi GMEZ had been extended to 50 miles around Kharg 
Island; Iraq warned that ships approaching Bandar Khomeni or Bushire would be 
sunk.232 Bandar Khomeni approaches had been mined the previous October.233 
Britain protested a March 1 Iraqi attack on a convoyed cargo ship, The Channing, in 
the Bandar Khomeni approaches; Indian and Turkish vessels were also at-
tacked.234 The war was creeping down the Gulf. Tankers were hit in Iraqi air at-
tacks on Kharg, and Iraq destroyed Saudi tankers outside its GMEZ. Iran attacked 
Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers, including a supertanker, Yanbu Pride, for the first time 
in April and May 1984.235 Iraqi attacks were airborne, since the Iran "blockade" 
had effectively bottled up Iraq's relatively weaker naval forces.236 Iraq had shifted 
its anti-shipping campaign focus in an effort to attack the weak link in Iran's war 
economy and to arouse world interest in the conflict,237 perhaps to "draw in other 
states, the Western powers in particular, in the hope that they would support Iraq 
and help to bring about a peaceful settlement.,,238 Iraq had some success in dis-
rupting Iranian oil exports; its attacks promoted third State measures designed to 
protect their nationals' commercial interests.239 In attacking mostly neutral-flag 
tankers sailing independently, 
Iraq appears to have devoted minimal effort to obtaining visual identification of the 
target before [launching missiles;] ... accidents ... did occur. Iran does not appear to 
have begun attacking commercial shipping until Iraq commenced its anti-tanker 
campaign .... Since there was no sea traffic with Iraq, Iran attacked neutral merchant 
shipping destined to and from neutral ports ... , presumably ... to persuade Iraq's 
financial backers, the other Gulf States, to dissuade Iraq from its campaign against 
the Kharg Island tankers. Iran's attacks on merchant shipping were less numerous ... 
and, in general, less costly in lives and property ... , [being] conducted with rockets 
instead of missiles .... Iran devoted more effort to target identification than did 
Iraq .... Iran did not conduct its attacks in declared ... zones[,] and some ... attacks 
were ... in neutral territorial waters.240 
This expansion of the Tanker Warled the United States to grant a Saudi requestto 
buy Stinger short-range air defense missile systems.241 The USSR supplied Iraq 
with weapons, consistent with its bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty, and 
at the same time Soviet weaponry may have found its way to Iran through North 
Korea and the PRe.242 Soviet arms sales seemed to follow the fortunes of the battle-
field and Soviet failure to achieve influence within Iran.243 France was becoming a 
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heavy supplier to Iraq244 and in 1984 sold $4.5 million in arms to Saudi Arabia,245 
which may have found their way to Iraq.246 Sweden began selling arms to Bahrain 
but mostly to Iran through middlemen in Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Singapore, 
Thailand and Yugoslavia. Among these sales were 40 "pleasure cruisers," as desig-
nated by a Swedish manufacturer, to the Iranian coast guard. At the same time the 
UN Secretary-General chose a Swedish politician who later became prime minis-
ter, OlafPalme, as mediator between the belligerents.247 
The Tunis May 9-10 Arab League Summit Conference strongly condemned at-
tacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers.248 The Soviet Union was concerned that Ira-
nian attacks on the tankers would result in a major regional war on its borders and 
a possibility of US intervention. Although the USSR negotiated with Iran in June 
1984 concerning Soviet military support ofIraq, little changed in Soviet behavior, 
which was becoming increasingly pro-Iraq, partly due to Iranian purges of pro-So-
viet groups in Iran.249 
In April an Iraq-laid mine had damaged a Saudi tanker, and in May Iran initi-
ated a retaliatory policy against Arab shipping.250 On May 21 the GCC States com-
plained to the Security Council about Iranian "acts of aggression on the freedom of 
navigation" to and from their ports, asserting that "Such acts of aggression consti-
tute a threat to the stability and security of the area and have serious implications 
for international peace and security.,,251 Iran justified the attacks on reaction 
against aid to Iraq by States in the region, and "indivisibility of security in the ... 
Gulf.,,252 Although this argument concededly had no basis in law, Iran hoped tar-
get States would pressure Iraq, whom they had been supplying,253 to stop attacks 
on Iran.254 During Council meetings many States addressed freedom of navigation . 
. . . Norway ... expressed regret that ships had been attacked in international waters 
outside the declared war zones, and stated that free and safe navigation should be 
secured for international shipping in the area .... Kuwait said that attacks against 
Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers were acts of aggression committed against ... two 
countries ... not parties to the ... conflict, carried out in violation of ... conventions 
according to which the high seas [were] open to all countries. This view was shared in 
general terms by other Gulf States such as Bahrain, Oman, [UAE] and Saudi Arabia. 
Yemen also denounced those attacks aimed against tankers belonging to States ... 
not parties to the conflict. The importance of ... free navigation and free commerce 
was further stressed by ... Ecuador, [FRG], India, Jordan, Liberia, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan[.] ... Panama called on the ... Council to take action to 
ensure that the right of free navigation and trade in international waters might be 
effectively exercised by all .... [T]he Netherlands pointed out the legal aspects of the 
attacks on shipping in the Gulf, recognizing that under international law belligerents 
may ... restrict shipping to and from ports of ... belligerents, and that such measures 
do of necessity affect the rights of third States under whose flags such shipping is 
conducted; ... deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against merchant shipping in 
any part of the Gulf were to be considered absolutely outside the scope of the 
permissible use of armed force. The Soviet Union, ... restating that any foreign 
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armed intervention in the ... Gulf was inadmissible, no matter what the pretext, 
asserted that international law demand[ed] strict observance of ... freedom of 
navigation, as laid down in general maritime law and in binding treaty obligations. 
The other permanent members of the ... Council reaffirmed in rather general terms 
the legitimate rights and interests of third States.255 
The Arab League Secretary General also invited the Council to take appropriate 
measures to protect navigation in the region and to ensure safety of international 
sea lanes and channels.256 Many States addressing the Council had vessels under 
their registries, perhaps under flags of convenience (e.g., Liberia, Panama), or were 
major carriers, in the Gulf trade. Many had been or would be major naval players in 
the Tanker War.257The resulting Resolution 552 Gune 1, 1984) 
· .• Gall[ed] upon all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the 
right of freedom of navigation; ... Reaffirm[ed] the right of free navigation in 
international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all ports and 
installations of the littoral States that are not parties to the hostilities; ... Gall[ed] 
upon all State to respect the territorial integrity of the States ... not parties to the 
hostilities ... ; ... Gondemn[ed] the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and 
from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; .. . Demand[ed] that such attacks should 
cease forthwith and that there should be no interference with ships en route to and 
from States ... not parties to the hostilities; ... Decide[ed], in the event of 
non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet again to consider effective 
measures ... commensurate with the gravity of the situation ... to ensure the freedom 
of navigation in the area .... 258 
A GCC draft resolution would have named Iran as an aggressor.259 A week later the 
London Economic Summit of major Western powers and Japan 
· .. expressed [its] deep concern at the mounting toll in human suffering, physcial 
damage and bitterness that this conflict has brought; and at the breaches of 
international humanitarian law that have occurred. 
· .. The hope and desire ... is that both sides will cease their attacks on each other 
and on the shipping of other States. The principle of freedom of navigation must be 
respected. \Y/e are concerned that the conflict should not spread further and we shall 
do what we can to encourage stability in the region. 
· .. We also considered the implications for world oil supplies .... [T]he world oil 
market has remained relatively stable .... [T]he international system has both the 
will and the capacity to cope with any foreseeable problems through the continuation 
of the prudent and realistic approach ... being applied.260 
Almost simultaneously Saudi aircraft, with US AWACS help, downed an Iranian 
figh ter over the Gulf after two warnings; there was a dispute as to whether it was in 
international or Saudi airspace, but in any event Iran appeared unwilling to 
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challenge the Saudis. Two weeks later Saudi Arabia established an Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ), the Fahd Line, beyond Saudi territorial sea limits. 
This allowed Saudi interceptors, guided by US AWACS and refuelled by US air 
tankers, to engage other aircraft, primarily Irani, threatening shipping.261 Saudi 
Arabia also proclaimed a 12-mile safety corridor within the GCC States' territorial 
sea. It was intended to provide security for neutral shipping carrying oil from Ku-
wait and other supporters ofIraq.262 
At the same time, however, pragmatists within Iran tried to reassure GCC 
States; a diplomatic breakthrough for Iran came a year later, in May 1985, when 
the Saudi foreign minister paid an official State visit. There were also high-level 
exchanges between Iran and Oman and the UAE. The one area where diplomatic 
progress eluded Iran was the tanker war. Even here, for more than a year Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia tried to resolve differences through bilateral negotiations. The 
Tanker War was not amenable to diplomatic solution between the Gulf Arabs and 
Iran, because it was an Iraqi war policy. Iraq controlled the timing and intensity of 
attacks on Iranian shipping and oil installations; with fewer operational aircraft 
and weapons, Iran had to choose when and against whom to respond. Tankers car-
rying Kuwaiti oil became special targets ofIranian attacks because of all the GCC 
countries, Iran had the least friendly relations with Kuwait, which was far weaker 
militarily than Saudi Arabia.263 
During the summer of 1984 mines detonated in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait 
ofBab el Mandeb, choke points for the Red Sea to the west of Saudi Arabia, damag-
ing several ships. Although Iran and Libya were accused oflaying the mines, Iran 
denied the charges; it is thought that the Libyan cargo ship Ghat laid them. Egypt 
exercised its right under the Constantinople Convention to inspect all shipping, 
and a half dozen navies cooperated in locating and destroying the mines. Saudi 
Arabia received US assistance in sweeping its ports ofJidda and Yanbu.264 
A UN -sponsored ceasefire in the land war supposedly lasted from June 1984 to 
March 1985. The belligerents agreed to stop attacks on civilian population cen-
ters.265 Iran proposed that the truce include Gulf shipping as well, and Iraq in-
sisted that any agreement must allow it to repair or replace its Gulf oil export facili-
ties. Impasse resulted.266 Kuwait also negotiated with the Netherlands to buy 
mine-hunting ships;267 a UK order had forbidden export of small boats and boat 
parts.268 
The UN Secretary-General report mandated by Resolution 552 included States' 
concerns over incidents since June 4. The report, later supplemented, expressed 
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) "deep concern" over "serious 
escalation of attacks on innocent and neutral merchant ships and their crews" in 
the war. The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) chair and the President of 
the International Shipping Federation (ISF) also declared that merchant shipping 
attacks "had led to much loss oflife and to the destruction and damage of many 
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vessels; they appealed to the Secretary-General and the [UN] to continue efforts to 
end the attacks." The Secretary-General brought these concerns and Resolution 
552 to the belligerents' attention.269 
6.1985: War of the Cities Renewed; The Tanker War Continues; 
Heightened Responses. 
In 1985 the truce was broken; the War of the Cities was renewed.270 In April Eu-
ropean heads of State issued a declaration asking for the war to end and for 
belligerents to stop using chemical weapons; at the same time, however, large ship-
ments of European arms began arriving in Iraq.271 Iraq successfully renewed at-
tacks on Kharg and Iranian tankers; Iran restarted a campaign against neutral 
tankers with less success.272 By the end of 1985 "the tanker war had [become] the 
most important feature of the Iran-Iraq War.,,273 In June 1985 Iran had inter-
cepted and detainedAI-Muharaq, a Kuwaiti-flag ship Kuwait bound but suppos-
edly carrying "5 tonnes of merchandise clearly intended for Iraq." Iraq had been 
using Kuwait as an entry port for goods since the beginning of the war.274 (It was 
only in late 1987 and early 1988 that Iran enacted a prize law;275 this ex post facto 
legislation was justification for seizure of AI-Muharaq and other Kuwait-bound 
ships.)276 In September Iran's visit and search procedures, looking for strategic 
materials for Iraq, were stepped up. Although Iran could not (or chose not to try 
to)277 close Hormuz by military action, Iran might succeed in scaring off enough 
shipping to make a difference,278 since oil sales financed Iraq's war effort, and it 
had to ship through the Gulf, being denied Mediterranean Sea pipeline access ex-
cept through Turkey.279 Iranian crude was now being ferried in Iranian tankers 
from Kharg to Sirri Island in the lower Gulf, where it was stored in "mother" ships 
for transfer to customers' tankers. Iranian tanker shuttles also operated between 
Kharg and Lavan Island in the lower Gulf.280 Iran also established a helicopter 
base on its offshore Reshadat oil platform 75 miles from the Qatari coast.281 Iran 
was also beginning to feel the pinch of seriously depleted stocks of replacement 
parts, particularly for its air force.282 
The August 1985 Casablanca Arab League summit supported prior resolutions 
favoring Iraq. "It was against this background that Baghdad mounted its effective 
air strikes against Kharg oil terminal.,,283 Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, South Yemen 
and Syria boycotted the meeting; in June 1985 Libya and Iran had signed a Strate-
gic Alliance Treaty. These moves were seen as evidencing growing division in the 
Arab world over the war.284 Turkey continued to support Iraq, the United States 
had formally restored diplomatic relations with Iraq in November 1984, and the 
US-Iraq trade became three times (at$1 billion), that of the USSR with Iraq. Direct 
links between the US embassy in Baghdad and the United States were estab-
lished?85 France continued as a major supplier for Iraq, although she also supplied 
Iran. China was Iran's major supplier through North Korea, but it too supplied 
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Iraq, through Egypt. Iran was becoming more isolated, however.2S6 At the same 
time Soviet sales to Iraq increased, the USSR reduced oil imports from financially 
strapped Iran.287 
Because of the belligerents' actions, the United States published this NOTMAR 
Special Warning in September 1985: 
1. u.s. Mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the ... 
Gulfwhich are becoming increasingly dangerous due to continued attacks on vessels 
outside the military zones declared by Iran and Iraq. 
2. In view of recent Iranian visit, search, and in some cases seizure of vessels of 
third countries within the ... Strait ofHormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, U.S. mariners 
are advised to exercise extreme caution and to be alert to possible hazardous 
conditions, including hostile actions, when transiting these waters. 
3 .... Iran ... has issued guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant 
shipping in the ... Gulf, the relevant portions of which are ... : 
-After transiting ... Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian ports 
should pass 12 miles south of Abu Musa Island; 12 miles south ofSirri Island; 
south of Cable Bank Light; 12 miles south of Farsi Island; thence west of a line 
connecting the points 27-55N, 49-53E, and 29-ION, 49-12E.; thereafter south 
of the line 29-ION, as far as 48-40E. 
-All Iranian coastal waters are war zones. 
-All transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited. 
- ... Iran ... wiII bear no responsibility for merchant ships failing to 
comply with the above instructions. 
4. Deep draft shipping should be aware of shoal waters south of Farsi Island. 
5 .... Iraq ... has stated that the area north of29-30N is a prohibited war zone. It 
has warned that it wiII attack all vessels appearing within a zone believed to be north 
and east of a line connecting the following points: 29-30N, 48-30E, 29-25N, 49-09E, 
28-23N, 49-47E, 28-23N, 51-00E .... Iraq ... has further warned that all tankers 
docking at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets for the Iraqi Air Force. 
6. In view of continued hostilities between Iran and Iraq and recent acts of 
interference or hostility against vessels of their countries, U.S. mariners are advised, 
until further notice, to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters and to remain 
outside the areas delimited in paragraphs 3 and 5 above. 
The NOTMAR added that the United States did not recognize the validity in law 
of any foreign rule, regulation or proclamation so published.288 "While the United 
States obviously recognized provocations by both sides ... , it ... regarded Iranian 
attacks against neutral shipping as the major problem. [US] policy regarding the 
war was to avoid military involvement, if possible, while providing friendly Gulf 
States with [means] ... to defend themselves.,,289 For example, while asserting 
freedom of the seas and straits transit passage policies, the United States offered to 
work with the Gee and to help it militarily if aid was requested publicly and there 
was access to suitable facilities.290 At about the same time Gee-Iran relations 
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appeared to be improving.291 Individual GCC members' policies continued as 
before, however. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait aided Iraq with $4 billion in 1984, and 
late that year Iranian aircraft penetrated the Saudi ADIZ and hit a Kuwait-bound 
freighter. There was an assassination attempt on the Kuwaiti emir in May 1985, 
said to have been fomented by Iran.292 The United Kingdom announced a $3-4 
billion sale of combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia.293 The UAE mostly continued to 
support Iran, with $1 billion in trade between them. The UAE was concerned 
about its offshore oil facilities, which pumped two-thirds of its oil. Moreover, 20 
percent of its population were Shiites.294 
In October 1985 France began defending French-flag merchantmen. A French 
warship positioned itselfbetween the Ville d'Angers and an Iranian warship, warn-
ing the Iranian that it would use force if the Iranian tried to intercept Ville d'Angers. 
French ROE declared that French warships would fire on forces refusing to break 
off attacks on neutral merchant ships; the result was a drop in attacks near French 
men-of-war.295 
7. 1986: Boarding of Merchant Ships; Attacks on Shipping and Port Facilities. 
On January 12,1986 Iran boarded and searched the President Taylor, a US-flag 
vessel.296 The United States acknowledged a belligerent's right to board and 
search but cautioned about overstepping rights and norms, "and even violence, in-
herent in all ship search incidents.,,297 Later that month the UK justified Iranian 
interceptions and seizures of UK-flagged merchantmen as self-defense.298 The 
Netherlands recognized the right of visit and search but only for ships proceeding 
to and from belligerents' ports.299 In April 1986 a US destroyer warned an Iranian 
warship off what may have been a planned boarding of S.S. President McKinley, a 
US flag merchantman. 
In February 1986 Security Council Resolution 582 called for a ceasefire; it "De-
plore[ d] the escalation of the conflict, especially territorial incursions, the bombing 
of purely civilian population centres, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian air-
craft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed con-
flict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to ... the Geneva Gas 
Protocol.,,300 That month Iraq extended its exclusion zone up to an area close to 
Kuwaiti territorial waters.301 Also in that month, the United States concluded its 
agreement with the United Kingdom for use of Diego Garcia as a naval support fa-
cility.302 
In May, after more Iranian strikes on shipping, the United States reaffirmed a 
commitment to Saudi self-defense, freedom of navigation, free flow of oil, and 
open access through Hormuz.303 That day Iran warned that its naval forces would 
attack US warships escorting or convoying cargo ships carrying cargo for Iraq or 
which tried to interfere with Iran's interception procedures.304 A US May 14 
NOTMAR advised: 
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1. U.S. naval forces operating in international waters within the ... Gulf, Strait of 
Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of twenty degrees north are 
taking additional defensive precautions against terrorist threats. All surface and 
subsurface ships and craft are requested to avoid closing U.S. forces closer than five 
nautical miles without previously identifying themselves. U.S. forces especially 
when operating in confined waters, shall remain mindful of navigational 
considerations of ships and craft in their immediate vicinity. It is requested that radio 
contact with U.S. naval forces be maintained on [designated frequencies] when 
approaching within five nautical miles of U.S. naval forces. Surface and subsurface 
ships and craft that close U.S. naval furces within five nautical miles without making 
prior contact and or whose intentions are unclearto such forces may be held at risk by 
U.S. defense measures. 
2. These measures will also apply when U.S. forces are engaged in transit passage 
through ... Hormuz or when in innocent passage through foreign territorial waters 
and when operating in such waters with the approval of the coastal State. 
The Notice was published "solely to advise that measures in self-defense will be ex-
ercised by US naval forces .... [and] will be implemented in a manner that does not 
impede the freedom of navigation of any vessel or State.,,30S 
In August Iraq bombed Iran's Sirri oil terminal for the first time; a UK-regis-
tered, Hong Kong-owned tanker was badly damaged. By that month Iraq had hit 
five of the 11 shuttle tankers operating between Kharg and Sirri. Iran's Lavan and 
Larak oil terminals were bombed later that year. In September 1986 Iranian war-
ships fired on, stopped and searched a USSR merchantman, PyatT Emtsov, Kuwait 
bound with arms ultimately destined for Iraq.306 During 1985-86 Iran inspected 
over 1000 vessels.307 In October Security Council Resolution 588 called for com-
pliance with Resolution 582.308 In November Iraq bombed the UAE Abu al-
Bukhosh off-shore oil installations.309 The 1986 Iraqi attacks reduced Iranian oil 
production considerably; a fall in world oil prices aggravated Iran's economic 
straits.310 
A November 20 US International NOTAM reported Iranian airspace was 
closed to US-flag aircraft and that 
u.S. Naval Forces in the ... Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian 
Sea (North of20 Degrees North) are taking additional defensive precautions against 
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL which are not cleared for 
approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid approaching 
closer than 5 nm to U.S. Naval Forces. 
It is requested that aircraft approaching within 5 nm of U.S. Naval Forces 
establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. Naval Forces on [certain frequencies]. 
Aircraft which approach within 5 nm at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL whose 
intentions are unclear to U.S. Naval Forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive 
measures ... }11 
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In that month UK naval presence increased due to increased attacks on neutral 
shipping.312 
Iraq began to default on foreign loans, but its leading creditors-the FRG, 
France, Japan and Turkey-rescheduled debts, along with India and Yugoslavia. 
By 1986 Iraq's pipeline through Saudi Arabia was in operation, and another 
through Turkey was under construction. Oil sales from these conduits would reas-
sure creditors.313 The USSR began a massive military support program of$4.9 bil-
lion for 1986, compared with $4 billion for the previous year, for Iraq. However, in 
August Saudi Arabia had to abandon its price-war strategy at the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which helped its relations with Iran.314 
The Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, appeared to begin a 
new policy toward the war, resolving to ending it by expanding diplomatic con-
tacts with Iran. Nevertheless USSR arms sales to Iraq continued until the end.315 
By the next year the Soviet Union was in effect underwriting much of the Iraqi de-
fense effort.316 Although not known at the time, US arms sales to Iran through Is-
rael in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra affair began about then.317 A 
Danish-flag vessel, Else-HT, made voyages with these goods on board in May and 
June from Eilat, an Israeli port on the Gulf of Aqaba and near Jordan's Port of 
Aqaba, to Bandar Abbas.318 After an Iranian attack on a UK merchantman in Sep-
tember, Britain closed Iran's military procurement office in London. Britain was 
Iraq's second largest nonmilitary supplier.319 UK companies helped with tools 
and parts too.320 
8. 1987: Escalating US Involvement; Reflagging and Convoys; 
Attack on U.S.S. Stark. 
In late January 1987 the ICO met in Kuwait and heard the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral call for an international panel to determine war guilt. Iran boycotted the meet-
ing. The United States moved six warships, usually based in Bahrain, to the upper 
Gulf to provide naval cover for the meeting.321 About then an Italian yard deliv-
ered two corvettes and a support ship to Iraq; they sailed for Alexandria, Egypt, en 
route to Umm Qasr, an Iraqi port. Warned ofa possible Iranian Silkworm attack, 
they returned to Italy.322 
In March 1987 the United States expressed concern over Iran's testing llOO-
pound warhead, 85 kilometer range, PRC-manufactured Silkworm missiles in the 
Gulf. Kuwait became increasingly concerned about Iranian attacks on its tankers 
and requested Soviet and US protection. Internationalization of the Tanker War 
was "exactly what [Iran] wanted to avoid, but ... that is precisely what happened." 
The war had entered a new phase.323 (A US congressman also suggested mining 
Iranian ports to force it to stop its attacks in the Gul£ )324 In April Iran delivered a 
note through Algeria concerning the right of transit passage through the Strait of 
Hormuz. The US response rejected an Iranian claim that LOS Convention 
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principles were contractual and not customary in nature, saying the LOS Conven~ 
tion represented longstanding customary law. The United States also "re-
ject[ ed] ... any claim by Iran of a right to interfere with any vessel's lawful exercise 
of the right of transit passage in a strait used for international navigation.,,325 
In May Kuwait and the United States completed negotiations leading to trans-
fer of II tankers owned by Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Co. (KOTC), the Kuwaiti State 
shipping company, from the Kuwaiti to the US flag. This preempted the USSR, 
which had to settle for chartering three tankers to Kuwait; these charters were 
later renewed into 1988.326 The Soviet Union was "deliberately vague on the ques-
tion of military protection.,,327 The UK position, stated in Parliament after the 
first US convoy sailed, was that vessel owners were free to reregister their vessels as 
long as national requirements were met, and that with reregistration went an obli-
gation for the Royal Navy to defend these vessels.328 Three KOTC tankers were 
later reregistered in Britain.329 The USSR kept its arrangement with Kuwait in 
perspective; a rapid Soviet naval buildup in the Gulf might prompt a much greater 
US naval presence and might provoke GCC concerns about the USSR, both con-
trary to Soviet interests.330 In June 1987 a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister said the 
USSR had no intention of increasing its naval force in the Gulf.331 Although as-
sailed in some quarters, most commentators felt US reflagging comported with in~ 
ternationallaw.332 Iran tried to pursuade Kuwait to stop the reflagging process; 
when this failed, Iran declared that Kuwait had practically turned itself into an 
Iraqi province with its resources at the disposition of France, the USSR and the 
United States. Iran said it could not allow Iraq to receive guaranteed oil income to 
beefup its war machine through Kuwaiti tankers flying other flags.333 
At about this time an Iranian patrol boat fired on and damaged a Soviet mer-
chantman, Ivan Koroteav. In mid-Maya Soviet tanker chartered to Kuwait, Mar-
shal Chuykhov, hit a mine which the USSR said Iran laid. A second Kuwait-bound 
tanker was mined on June 19. Mines were detected in approaches to the channel 
leading to Kuwait's Mina Ahmadi terminal. 334 Mines began appearing through~ 
out the Gul£ Iranian small boats, Revolutionary Guards crewed, laid them just be-
fore a preselected vessel arrived in the area.335 The Saudi and US navies took a 
month to clear the channel to Kuwait and its approaches.336 A Soviet response to 
attacks on its merchantmen was to deploy three more minesweepers to the Gulf.337 
On May 17 two Iraqi fighter-launched Exocet missiles hit the frigate U.S.S. 
Stark, presumably unintentionally. There were deaths and injuries among its crew 
and severe damage to the ship.338 (In 1989 Iraq paid US claims for the Stark at-
tack.)339 There is no report of the extent of pollution resulting from loss of bunker 
fuel; this appears to be true for later attacks on naval vessels in engagements. The 
United States added three ships to MIDEASTFOR, ordered its forces to a higher 
state of alert340 and revised its Rules of Engagement (ROE) for possible interac-
tions between US and Iraqi forces and anyone else displaying hostile intent or 
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committing hostile acts.341 UK ROE continued to reflect Britain's view that the 
UN Charter, Article 51, governed UK responses.342 "The rules of engagement 
[ were] intended to avoid escalation, although the varied nature of potential threat 
and the possibility of surprise attack [were] recognized and the inherent right of 
self-defence of Royal Navy ships or British merchant vessels under their protec-
tion, is not circumscribed or prejudiced." The result would have posed "interest-
ing questions" if a UK warship could have defended UK merchantmen or 
British-crewed ships. One "practical solution" might have been that attack on a 
merchant ship "might reasonably [have been] perceived as an attack on the war-
ship as well. In that situation, the warship [would] be able to defend itself and in 
doing so defend the merchant vessel accompanying it. ,,343 The nature of other na-
val participants' ROE have not been published, but undoubtedly they reflected, or 
were limited by, States' views on the scope of self-defense, national policies, and 
defense capabilities.344 
The US ROE had their complement in a July 1987 US NOTAM and NOTMAR: 
A. In response to the recent attack on ... Stark and the continuing terrorist threat 
in the region[,] U.S. naval vessels operating within the ... Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, 
Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, north of 20 degrees north, are taking additional 
defensive precautions. It is requested that aircraft (fIxed wing and helicopters) 
approaching U.S. naval forces establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval 
forces on [designated frequencies]. UnidentifIed aircraft whose intentions are 
unclear or who are approaching U.S. naval vessels may be requested to identify 
themselves and state their intentions as soon as they are detected .... [T]o avoid 
inadvertent confrontation, aircraft ... including military aircraft may be requested to 
remain well clear of U.S. vessels. Failure to respond to requests for identification and 
intentions or to warnings and operating in a threatening manner could place the 
aircraft at risk by U.S. defensive measures. Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a 
weapons fIre control radar could result in immediate U.S. defensive reaction. 
The notice was published "solely to advise that measures in self-defense are being 
exercised by US naval forces in this region." The NOTAM/NOTMAR closed: 
"[T]hese measures will be implemented in a manner that does not unduly interfere 
with the freedom of navigation and overflight[.] ... ,,345 This Notice was revised in 
September 1987: 
In response to the recen t attack on ... Stark and the continuing terrorist threat in 
the region, U.S. naval vessels operating within the ... Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf of 
Oman, and the Arabian Sea, north of 20 degrees north, are taking additional 
defensive precautions. Aircraft (fIxed wing and helicopters) operating in these areas 
should maintain a listening watch on [certain frequencies]. UnidentifIed aircraft, 
whose intentions are unclear or who are approaching U.S. naval vessels, will be 
contacted on these frequencies and requested to identify themselves and state their 
intentions as soon as they are detected .... [T]o avoid inadvertent confrontation, 
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aircraft ... including military aircraft may be requested to remain well clear of U.S. 
vessels. Failure to respond to requests for identification and intentions, or to 
warnings, and operating in a threatening manner could place the aircraft ... at risk by 
U.S. defensive measures. Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a weapons fire 
control radar will be viewed with suspicion and could result in immediate U.S. 
defensive reaction. This notice is published solely to advise that measures in 
self-defense are being exercised by U.S. naval forces in this region. The measures will 
be implemented in a manner that does not unduly interfere with the freedom of 
navigation and overflight .... 
U.S. naval forces in the ... Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea 
(North of 20 Degrees North) are taking additional defensive precautions against 
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL which are not cleared for 
approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid approaching 
closer than Snm to U.S. naval forces. 
It is requested that aircraft approaching within Snm of U.S. naval forces establish 
and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies]. 
Aircraft approaching within Snm at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL whose 
intentions are unclear to U.S. naval forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive 
measures .... 346 
This was a much stronger statement of intentions than the Notice of a year ear-
lier.347 "In the wake of the Kuwaiti reflagging, it was (perhaps deliberately) left un-
clear as to how far the [US] protective umbrella was to extend." Promises of escort 
for US- flagged ships would "depend ... on the situation" as well as for foreign flag 
shipping in certain cases.348 The US reaction may have been partly due to media 
reports of Iran's training 20,000 Revolutionary Guards to attack US ships in fast 
Swedish-built "pleasure boats.,,349 
In July the US Navy began convoying reflagged tankers.350 Previously the 
United States "had found intermittent convoys an effective deterrent to Iranian 
action. Indeed, Iran refrained from harassing ships carrying other flags when they 
sailed in the vicinity of US warships. ,,351 Only a small percentage of tankers plying 
the Gulfwere convoyed, however.352 Reflagged tankers carried no contraband to 
or oil from Iraq.353 On July 24 the reflaggedBridgeton and on August 10 the Texaco 
Caribbean, under charter to a US company, hit mines; the Navy began providing 
mine protection.354 (Although US Navy destroyer types had escorted Bridgeton to 
Kuwait, the Navy outfitted Kuwaiti commercial tugs with minesweeping gear for 
the return trip. When civilian tug crews refused to undertake minesweeping, Navy 
volunteers manned the tugs for the return.355 "[T]he [Bridgeton] incident opened a 
chapter of direct US-Iran naval confrontation in the Gul£,,356 Whether a result of 
deliberate Iranian decision or Iranian Revolutionary Guard fervor, mines began 
appearing all over the Gulf and outside the Gulf, in the Strait ofHormuz and Gulf 
of Oman, and in Kuwaiti and Omani territorial waters. French and UK naval 
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operations expanded to meet the threat in the latter areas.357 In late August U.S.S. 
Guadalcanal rescued an Iraqi fighter pilot downed by an Iranian air-to-air missile 
in international waters. He was repatriated through Saudi Red Crescent Society of-
ficials. There is no record ofIranian consent or protest.358 
The UK Armilla Patrol began "accompanying" but not escorting or convoying 
UK merchantmen; one result was that foreign vessels were attracted to UK regis-
try to gain protection, at least in the lower Gulf, where there were new mine 
threats. British vessels were not armed against attacks; UK seafarer unions op-
posed arming.359 Italy opposed it as a matter of policy too.360 After Iranian forces 
attacked a French flag cargo ship, Ville d'Anvers, France broke off diplomatic rela-
tions. However, even with reinforced naval presence, it could not organize convoy 
protection on the US model and relied on a policy of accompanying French flag 
ships.361 The USSR sent a Krivak class frigate to escort four Soviet ships carrying 
arms from the Strait ofHormuz to Kuwait for ultimate destination in Iraq, a signal 
to belligerents that the USSR would protect Soviet-flag ships. 362 Some merchant-
men began to carry chaff canisters to confuse incoming missiles; others were re-
painted dull, non-reflective gray for the same reason. Although most merchant 
ships remained unarmed, a US helicopter reported corning under missile fire from 
a Greek ship. Iran reportedly completed testing its Silkworm missiles. Press re-
ports said Iran's air force had established a suicide plane squadron to attack mer-
chant shipping like the World War II Japanese kamikazi flights.363 Iran began 
three days of naval maneuvers in the Gulf, dubbed Exercise Martyrdom, which in-
volved firing a shore-to-ship missile and ramming a speedboat loaded with explo-
sives into a dummy naval target.364 Some Iranian naval maneuvers were in Saudi 
territorial waters.365 Besides traditional boardings, Iran began using helicopters 
for visit and search.366 The Gulfwas becoming a more dangerous place as actors 
crowded the arena and employed new techniques for old methods and new 
technologies. 
Two US warships' Sparrow missiles shot at a radar target suspected of hostile 
intent missed, and warning shots were fired across two dhows' bows in August.367 
The US Navy, claiming a right of self-defense, captured the Iranian landing ship 
IranAjr caught laying mines in September. 368 Three Iranian crew died, two were 
lost at sea, and the United States repatriated 26 crewmen to Iran through Omani 
Red Crescent auspices five days later. Shortly thereafter they were turned over to 
Iranian officials, along with the remains of the three who had died. It is not known 
whether Iraq consented or objected to these arrangements.369 Iran asserted that 
self-defense could only be claimed in response to an armed attack and that this was 
aggression.370 It also promised revenge and gave an "explicit warning" that it 
would soon be engaged on another front.371 However, the US attack "effectively 
halted Iranian minelaying for six months.,,372 But by mid-1987 Iranian aircraft, 
helicopters, small boats and warships had attacked over 100 ships of30 nationalities. 
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Iraq had attacked over 200 vessels, mostly Iranian owned or chartered.373 In late 
May 1987 the USSR had sent three minesweepers to join two frigates that had pa-
trolled the Gulf since 1986; this was in response to Iranian mining of Soviet-flag 
ships.374 
The June 1987 Venice Economic Summit had "agree[ d] that new and concerted 
international efforts [were] urgently required to bring the Iran-Iraq War to an 
end." Besides calling upon the belligerents to end the war and supporting the 
United Nations, the Summit "reaffirm [ ed] that the principle of freedom of naviga-
tion in the Gulf is of paramount importance for us and for others and must be up-
held. The free flow of oil and other traffic through the Strait ... must continue 
unimpeded." The Summit pledged to consult on ways to pursue these important 
goals effectively.375 In July unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 598 
Deplor[ed] ... bombing of purely civilian population centres, attacks on neutral 
shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and 
other laws of armed conflict, and ... use of chemical weapons contrary to ... the 1925 
Geneva Gas Protocol, ... Demand[ed that belligerents] ... observe an immediate 
cease-fire [and] Call[ed] upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to 
refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict 
The Resolution also declared for the first time during the war that there had been a 
breach of the peace and that the Council was acting under the UN Charter, Articles 
39_40.376 Iraq accepted Resolution 598 on July 23.377 On September 3 the 12-mem-
ber European Community supported Resolution 598, "strongly condemn[ing] re-
cent attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf and reiterat[ing] ... firm support for the 
fundamental principle of freedom of navigation, which is of the utmost impor-
tance to the whole international community.,,378 
On August 3 Iran had announced it planned naval maneuvers in its territorial 
waters in the Gulf and in the Gulf of Oman, warning all vessels, commercial or mil-
itary, against approaching these waters. Iraq protested, noting that Iranian territo-
rial waters included part of the Strait ofHormuz and waters between the Tunb and 
Forur islands, claiming that under the 1982 LOS Convention, Article 38(1),379 
and the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 16(4),380 that Iran could not sus-
pend passage through international straits, and that the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) had declared shipping lanes passing close to Tunb and 
Forur.381 
By the end of July US Navy escorts had been receiving informal cooperation 
from France and Britain and support and assistance from Saudi Arabia and other 
GCC States. 382 In July and August France ordered its aircraft carrier Clemenceau to 
the Gulf; France's prime minister declaring, "We have no aggressive intentions, 
but we want to be respected and we will be respected.,,383 In August, Britain384 and 
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France agreed to send minesweepers to the Gulf, and by September Italian,385 Bel-
gian and Netherlands ships, the latter to operate jointly with Armilla Patrol pro-
tection,386 were on the way. Saudi Arabia committed its four minesweepers to 
clearance operations.387 On August 20, the Western European Union (WEU) de-
clared Europe's vital interests required that freedom of navigation in the Gulfbe 
assured at all times.388 The capacity ofWEU members to consult on this policy 
"was all the more important[,] given a previous record of disunity.,,389 By now Iran 
had lost the international diplomatic leverage ithad been cultivating for the previ-
ous three years.390 
On October 8, Iranian speedboats fired on US helicopters; in accordance with 
US self-defense principles and ROE, the helicopters returned fire, sinking one 
boat and damaging others. Iran claimed the US helicopters fired first and vowed a 
"crushing response." Some argued it was a "carefully calculated reprisal.,,391 US 
Navy personnel rescued six Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat crew members; two 
died aboard U.S.S. Raleigh. Survivors and remains were returned to Iran through 
Omani Red Crescent auspices. It is not known whether Iraq consented or objected 
to repatriation.392 Later that month the United States, claiming self-defense, 
responded to an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Silkworm attack in Kuwaiti 
territorial waters on a US flag tanker, Sea Isle City, by destroying the Iranian 
Rostum offshore oil platform in the southern Gulf. Sea Isle City's master, a US 
national, was blinded in the attack. When the attack on Sea Isle City occurred, it 
was not under US Navy convoy; convoying ceased when vessels reached Kuwaiti 
territorial waters. Rostum was a Guards gunboat communications base and was 
not directly involved in the Silkworm strike. Those manning it were given time to 
evacuate before the attack began. Rostum apparently was not engaged in oil 
production; therefore, the attack did not create a threat to the environment.393 
The US strike was stated to be in specific response to the Sea Isle City attack; 
connection with an Iranian attack on theSungari, which had occurred a day before 
Sea Isle City was hit, was avoided. Although Sungari was beneficially US owned, it 
was Liberian flagged.394 Iran claimed the platform attacks were aggression and 
that self-defense could only be asserted in response to armed attack.395 (US import 
controls on Iranian goods were said to be a reason for the attacks.396 There is some 
evidence Iran was aiming at oil tankers in the Kuwaiti port of AI-Hamadi, where 
Kuwaiti and Saudi oil donated to Iraq was being lifted to pay for ammunition 
shipped to Iraq through the Port of Aqaba.)397 US response for the Sea Isle City 
Silkworm attack, and not for theSungari attack, established some precedent that at 
this time the United States did not consider open registry ships, even if owned by 
US interests, to have enough connection to merit protection. This view changed as 
the war deepened, at least where US nationals were in the crew.398 There were no 
more confrontations with the United States for the next six months as a result of 
the US response on Rostum.399 Iranian Guards speedboats continued to harass 
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unprotected shipping; 400 three days after the US response to the Sea Isle City 
attack, Iran hit the Kuwaiti deep-water Sea Island Termina1.401 Iran made it clear 
that this action was intended as retaliation for the Rostum attack.402 
This exchange of blows was notable because ofIran's care not to attack the US 
directly but to target its regional allies .... [T]he most Iran did was to probe the extent 
and scope of the US commitment ... to find the weak links, the grey areas. Yet it did 
over-reach itself when it was caught red-handed in minelaying, thus unwittingly 
providing ammunition to those who argued that it was Iran that constituted a menace 
to the freedom of navigation .... [I]t found the impulse to defy the United States, 
whatever the consequences, irresistible, providing the [Iranian Islamic] revolution 
with the high drama that it so cherished, even at the risk of diverting from the 
princip[al] issue-the land war .... Iranian leaders were confident that the US 
presence could not last forever, that sooner or later the expense of the enterprise and 
the distraction of other issues ... would see a withdrawal of the US fleet.403 
Future events would prove this assessment to be incorrect. By the end of 1987 
Western naval presence in the Gulf appeared more durable than might earlier have 
been expected. However, for the time being Iran continued to see its strategy pay-
ing off, weakening US credibility with its Gulf allies, exasperating its military, and 
drawing the United States from impartiality to messy partisanship.404 
In November, an Arab League Extraordinary Summit "expressed anxiety at the 
continuation of the war and voiced ... indignation at [Iran's] intransigence, provo-
cations and threats to the Arab Gulf States." The Summit "condemned Iran's ... 
procrastination in accepting ... Resolution 598 ... [, and] called on Iran to accept 
the Resolution and implement it in toto . .. " The Summit asked the international 
community to "shoulder its responsibilities, exert effective international efforts 
and adopt measures adequate to make [Iran] respond to the calls for peace." Iraq's 
accepting Resolution 598 and positive response to peace initiatives was appreci-
ated. It confirmed support for Iran's defending its territory and "legitimate rights" 
but declared solidarity with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as to Iranian threats, aggres-
sion and violations of holy places.40S A few days later Iranian speedboats shot up 
three tankers carrying Saudi oil, but Syrian pressure succeeded in getting Iran to 
refrain from hitting targets in Kuwait.406 Iran's president visited the United Na-
tions to discuss a peace plan. However, UN diplomatic activity was to stop by early 
1988.407 Nevertheless, the Secretary-General continued to press Iran to accept the 
UN proposa1.408 It was only in October 1987 that Iran and Iraq formally broke off 
diplomatic relations,409 a further sign of polarization. 
During that month a US warship fired on a UAE fishing vessel, resulting in a 
death and three injured crew; the United States said it fired in self-defense but ex-
pressed regret over the incident, which had occurred between the UAE coast and 
Abu Musa, from which Iranian speedboats carried out Gulf shipping raids.410 The 
United States was particularly concerned about small boats; Iran had been 
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conducting naval maneuvers in its exclusion zone and territorial waters, including 
simulated speedboat attacks on suicide runs.411 In December a US warship helped 
rescue a Cypriot crew after an Iranian gunboat attack set their tanker ablaze. 
Tanker masters began tailing convoys or simulating them during night steam-
ing.412 During that monthH.M.S. Scylla and York protected merchant ships from 
Iranian speedboat attacks.413 
On December 11, NATO Council "Ministers underlined the importance of an 
early and full implementation of [Resolution] 598. They also recalled the impor-
tance of freedom and security of navigation in the Gulf. They call [ ed] for appropri-
ate follow-up action ... to resolve these problems.,,414 Late in December a GCC 
conference confined itself to expressing "deep regret at 'the destructive war' ... and 
urging the UN Security Council to implement Resolution 598 as soon as possible." 
Part of this was due to Omani and UAE opposition, caused by the geography that 
compelled Oman and Iran to patrol Hormuz jointly, and the UAE's financial affili-
ation with Iran. The growing risk to neutral shipping increased trade through the 
UAE, where goods would be shipped overland. Sentiment against an arms em-
bargo directed toward Iran was the same in the GCC and the Security Council. 
Nevertheless, the December GCC Summit approved a comprehensive security 
strategy that may have amounted to a collective self-defense pact.41S However, 
some governments, notably China, France, the FRG and the USSR, were per-
suaded that Iran's not rejecting Resolution 598 meant Iran might be genuinely in-
terested in a negotiated settlement to end the war. Permanent Security Council 
members (China, France, USSR) would veto any US-sponsored resolution to im-
pose sanctions.416 Iran claimed naval presences from States outside the Gulfvio-
lated Resolution 598, Article 5.417 
Meanwhile, the USSR and the United States continued to support Iraq, the So-
viet Union through military supplies, the United States by $961 million in agricul-
tural commodity credits in 1987.418 The USSR and its Eastern European s~tellites 
continued to send negligible amounts of military equipment to Iran, but there was 
no question about the USSR's priorities.419 
9. 1988: End Game: Intensity of Responses; Collapse and Cease fire. 
A January 2, 1988 US NOTMAR reflected the intensity of the situation: 
1. U.S. mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the ... 
Gulf, the Strait ofHormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, due to hostilities between Iran and 
Iraq. Mariners are further advised to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters 
and to remain outside the areas delimited in paragraphs 2 and 3 below until further 
notice. 
2. Iran has stated: 
A. Iranian coastal waters are war zones. 
B. Transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited. 
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e. Guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant shipping in the ... 
Gulf are ... : aftertransiting ... Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian 
ports should pass 12 miles south of Abu Musa Island; 12 miles south of Sirri 
Island; south of Cable Bank Light; 12 miles south of Farsi Island; thence west 
of a line connecting the points 27-SSN. 49-S3E. and 29-lON. 49-12E.; 
thereafter south of the line 29-lON. as far as 48-lOE. 
D .... Iran disclaims any responsibility for merchant ships failing to comply 
with the above instructions. 
E. Iranian naval forces patrol the Gulf of Oman up to 400 kilometers from 
the Strait ofHormuz. 
3. Iraq has stated: 
A. The area north of29-30N. is a prohibited war zone. 
B. It will attack all vessels appearing within a zone believed to be north and 
east of a line connecting the following points: 29-30N. 48-30E., 29-2SN. 
49-09E., 28-23N. 49-47E., 28-23N. Sl-OOE. 
e. All tankers docking at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets 
for the Iraqi Air Force. 
4. Several vessels have suffered damage from moored or floating mines in the ... 
Gulf. U.S. mariners should exercise caution in navigable waters throughout the Gulf 
region and particularly in the following areas where moored mines have been 
encountered: 
A. The Mina Al AhmadilMina Ash Shu'aybah Channel (28-S6N. 48-S3E.) 
and its approaches. 
B. The shipping channels south and west of Farsi Island. 
S. Mariners should be aware that Iranian naval forces visit, search and in some 
cases seize or divert to Iranian ports vessels of non-belligerents in the Persian 
Gulf/Gulf of Oman region. 
The United States took no position on the zones' legal validity.420 During 1987 the 
belligerents had attacked 178 merchantmen.421 
At the end of January 1988 Iran promulgated a prize law, article 3 of which de-
clared the following to be war prizes: 
(a) All goods, merchandise, means of transport and equipment belonging to a 
State or to States at war with ... Iran. 
(b) Merchandise and means of transport ... belonging to neutral States or their 
nationals, or to nationals of the belligerent State if they could effectively contribute to 
increasing the combat power of the enemy or their final destination, either direcdy or 
via intermediaries, is a State at war with ... Iran. 
(c) Vessels flying the flag of a neutral State as well as vehicles belonging to a 
neutral State transporting the goods set out in this article. 
(d) Merchandise, means of transport and equipment which ... Iran forbids from 
being transported to enemy territory.422 
The Law provided that property listed in Article 3(a), i.e., property of a State at war 
with Iran, would become the property ofIran; Article 3(b) and 3(c) property, i.e., of 
neutrals would be confiscated and adjudicated. Article 3(d) means of transport 
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would "become the property of ... Iran or be confiscated according to circum-
stances. Any person contesting this must appear before the [prize] Tribunal.,,423 
Iraqi attacks on tankers resumed February 10, 1988, after a month's lul1.424 The 
War of the Cities began again on February 28, 1988; Iran shelled Basra after Iraq 
bombed an oil refinery near Tehran. Iraq hit Halabja, an Iraqi town captured by 
Iran, with chemical weapons in March. Later that month Saudi Arabia confirmed 
buying 1600-mile CSS-2 ballistic missiles from the PRC. On March 30 Iranian 
gunboats fired on a Kuwaiti military base on Bubiyan Island. 
In early 1988 the United States noted Willingness to consider a UN Gulf naval 
force, if a collective action concept was spelled out clearly; the United States would 
not support a UN force replacing US and US-aligned forces.425 The United King-
dom was unenthusiastic,426 but Italy and the USSR supported the idea.427 The So-
viet Union wanted to replace the large Western naval presence with a UN 
flotilla.428 
During this time there were clashes involving US naval forces, several with Iran 
and one with Iraq.429 On April 14 U.S.S. SamuelB. Roberts, a frigate like Stark, hit a 
mine in a field Iran laid in shipping lanes in international waters 70 miles east of 
Bahrain.430 In response, on April 18, the United States engaged Iranian warships 
and neutralized two Iranian oil platforms that had conducted or supported attacks 
on neutral shipping. Occupants of the two oil platforms (Sassam and Sirri, both lo-
cated in the lower Gulf) were first given the opportunity to evacuate. Sirri had been 
responsible for about eight percent ofIran's oil exports. Iran saw the US response 
(which represented an escalation in US military action) as siding with Iraq, per-
haps because Iraq reconquered al-Faw near Basra the day of the Sassan/Sirri attack. 
Several Iranian naval units, including two frigates, were destroyed or damaged 
during that operation.431 This engagement, dubbed Operation Praying Mantis, 
was the largest combined air and surface engagement in war-at -sea forthe US Navy 
since World War II. Iran protested the platform attacks as aggression.432 The 
United States rejected the protest.433 A few days later Iranian speedboats attacked 
an oil rig in the UAE Mubarak oil field, operated by US interests, 30 miles north 
of Sharjah, and a tanker and freighter that were nearby. While thus engaged the 
boats were hit by US air strikes.434 Shipping and oil commerce in the southern 
Gulf virtually stopped for two days. UK- and French-accompanied convoys were 
temporarily halted.435 Some commentators trace the turning point in the war to 
April 17-18, when Iran lost the Fao peninsula to Iraq and their warships to the US 
Navy.436 
By now five NATO nations besides the United States-Belgium, Britain, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands-had sent over 25 warships to the Gulffor escort 
and mine suppression duty. The FRG, constitutionally restricted from sending 
forces there, augmented its Mediterranean Sea NATO presence with four ships. 
Nonvay sent a minesweep to NATO Channel Command; Luxembourg, which has 
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no navy, backed the Belgian-Dutch commitment financially. Australia and Japan, 
the latter also constitutionally limited, installed precise navigation transmitters in 
the Gulf and dispatched diver and mine disposal teams. The Netherlands Navy 
collaborated very closely with the Royal Navy. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands 
probably would not have deployed forces except for WEU's political cover.437 
French forces, reflecting France's longterm withdrawal from the NATO com-
mand structure, operated independently438 but cooperated with other navies, 
agreeing to consult within the WEU framework.439 Italy followed the same pol-
icy.440 WEU naval experts convened regular meetings in London to discuss the 
evolving threat.441 Even the USSR and US navies occasionally cooperated in find-
ing and destroying Iranian mines.442 At about the same time Hans Dietrich 
Genscher, the FRG foreign minister, was emerging as representing Iranian inter-
ests in efforts to end hostilities through mediation.443 However, "the unprece-
dented international concern and focus on the war in the United Nations and in 
the Gulf's waters, with the extraordinary and unprecedented participation of 
many European NATO States in an 'out of area' operation, ushered in a new phase" 
of the war.444 The multinational maritime naval operation was not, however, un-
der the command of any State or States.445 
After Iranian gunboats attacked a Saudi-owned tanker offDubai on April 24,446 
on April 29 the United States announced it would begin assisting "friendly, inno-
cent neutral vessels flying a nonbelligerent flag outside declared war exclusion 
zones that are not carrying contraband or resisting legitimate visit and search by a 
... Gulfbelligerent .... Following a request from the vessel under attack, assistance 
[would] be rendered by a US warship or aircraft if this unit [was] in the vicinity and 
its mission permit[ted] rendering such assistance.,,447 This incremental US esca-
lation, partly in response to requests from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and US oil ship-
pers navigating under foreign flags,448 was a more generous protection promise 
than Britain had announced in February, when UK policy shifted to permit pro-
tecting foreign flag ships having a clear majority UK interest in ownership.449 
This did not include Armilla Patrol protection for ships on which British seamen 
were employed.450 Although officially more conservative than the US policy, it 
was a distinction without a difference, since UK warships gave humanitarian as-
sistance to neutral vessels after an attack and were prepared to interpose between 
an attacker and a target ship. The interposing warships were prepared to assert 
self-defense if attacked while helping a foreign vessel. France pursued a similar, 
perhaps more forward-leaning interposition policy. French warships were "avail-
able to assist [meI:chantmen] according to circumstances.,,451 What French war-
ships would do in a confrontation is less than clear; French ROE stated options, 
but these have not been published.452 Italian escort was limited to Italian-flag mer-
chantmen, although Italian ROE promised response if a belligerent committed a 
hostile act; the ROE did not contemplate "repressive acts" directed toward bases of 
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operation.453 NATO countries agreed to provide mutual support and cooperation 
in keeping international waterways free of mines,454 although France operated 
separate mine clearance455 and Italy had separate bilateral arrangements for the 
work.456 
In May 1988 Iraqi air strikes hit Iran's Larak oil terminal in the Strait of 
Hormuz. Seawise Giant, Liberian registered and the world's largest supertanker, 
was among five ships damaged.457 Iran began a 10-day combined forces exercise in 
the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, to show that its maritime power was not as 
crippled as the United States had said.458 
The July 3 Airbus tragedy arose in the context ofIraqi speedboat attacks and 
concern over possible air attacks on US warships, or its supply barges anchored in 
Kuwaiti waters, perhaps to coincide with the Fourth ofJuly.459 In April 1988, dur-
ing Operation Praying Mantis,460 Iranian military aircraft had taken off from the 
nearby Bandar Abbas airport, also used by civil aviation. These aircraft appeared 
close to commencing attacks on US aircraft but did not.461 Other Iranian aircraft 
had exhibited "targeting behavior" while observing Praying Mantis events from 
afar, apparently to provide radar information,462 i.e., to possibly vector closer 
planes to targets. On July 2-3 Iranian speedboats positioned themselves at the 
western approach to the Strait ofHormuz to challenge merchant ships, a tactic that 
had been a prelude to attack.463 During the evening of July 2, U.S.S. Elmer Mont-
gomery had responded to a distress call from a Danish tanker under Iranian speed-
boat attacks.464 That same day nvo Iranian F-14s came within seven miles of 
U.S.S. Halsey.465 Other F-14s were known to be at Bandar Abbas.466 After Mont-
gomery heard challenges over the radio and many speedboats were seen approach-
ing a Pakistani merchantman on July 3, U.S.S. Vincennes was sent to the area to 
investigate the Montgomery report. Vincennes' helicopter was fired on by Iranian 
small boats, which "were deemed to have hostile intent." Vincennes opened fire on 
the boats. Two minutes later, Iran Air Flight 655, a civil airliner, took off from 
Bandar Abbas for Dubai, across the Gulf, on a flight path through the area of the 
on-going naval battle near Hormuz.467 Seven minutes later and after repeated 
radio warnings, and owing to Vincennes' preoccupation with the ongoing surface 
action and misinterpretation of electronic information and commercial air sched-
ules on board, Vincennes fired surface to air missiles that destroyed Flight 655. 
When Vincennes' commanding officer gave the order to fire, in the middle of the 
surface melee, he "believed that the Vincennes and the Montgomery were the subject 
of a coordinated sea and air attack involving [Iranian] Revolutionary Guard speed-
boats and an F-14 aircraft." The United States claimed a right of self-defense for 
the mistaken attack.468 
A week after the Airbus tragedy, US ship-based helicopters attacked Iranian 
gunboats that had set afire a Panama-registered, Japanese-owned tanker with US 
nationals in the crew,469 thus implementing the new US policy of defending other 
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countries' merchantmen upon their request and consistent with other US opera-
tional commitments.470 
By the end of the war the US Navy had conducted over 100 convoys in the 
Gulf.471 Other navies were also engaged in numerous escort operations. 
On the diplomatic front, Saudi Arabia broke relations with Iran April 27, 1988, 
a few days after US actions against Iranian warships and speedboats.472 Perhaps 
more importantly, during that year a pipeline from AI-Zubair in Iraq to Yanbu in 
Saudi Arabia was completed, allowing Iraqi oil to flow to Yanbu, where it could be 
shipped to South Africa for hard currency or arms.473 Iraq may have also com-
pleted a smaller pipeline to Turkey that year, which with the Yanbu line would 
have boosted its oil exports to 3.2 million barrels a day, about the prewar peak 
level.474 This may have been a counterpoint to Iran's economic cooperation accord 
of the previous summer with the Soviet Union, by which the USSR agreed to build 
a pipeline to carry Iranian oil to the Black Sea. A shipping route in the Caspian Sea 
was settled. A second connection between airline and railway systems was also 
planned.475 However, Iran's economy was in a shambles, with only $1 billion in 
foreign exchange reserves left, after an upswing the year before. Part of this erosion 
was due to Iraqi bombing in the first quarter ofl988, which reduced oil production 
considerably.476 
In June 1988 a second Arab League Extraordinary Summit reaffirmed its 1987 
stand on the war.477 On June 15 the European Community and the GCC issued a 
joint political declaration: 
... They explicitly emphasized that freedom of navigation and unimpeded flow of 
trade is a cardinal principle in international relations and international law. In this 
context, they call upon the international community to safeguard the right of free 
navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all 
ports and installations of the [Gulf] littoral States ... not parties to the hostilities.478 
The June 20 Toronto Economic Summit supported Resolution 598, condemned 
use of chemical weapons, deplored proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region, 
and "renew[ed the Group of Seven] commitment to uphold ... freedom ofnaviga-
tion in the Gulf.,,479 By mid-June Britain and France had restored diplomatic rela-
tions with Iran. (The United States had severed relations with Iran during the 
hostage crisis,480 and these were not restored.) Saudi Arabia announced a $12-30 
billion arms deal, including six to eight minesweepers, with Britain and bought 
1600-mile ballistic missiles from China.481 
Iran announced acceptance of Resolution 598 on July 17;482 on August 8 the 
UN Secretary-General announced a ceasefire effective August 20.483 The next day 
the Council approved the Secretary-General's report on the war and decided to es-
tablish UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)484 to help the peace 
process.485 Withdrawal from occupied territories began, but the 1990-91 war 
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ended UNIIMOG's mandate.486 UNIIMOG seemed to have worked reasonably 
well during its short commission.487 Negotiations between Iran and Iraq with re-
spect to their disputed border began simultaneously with the ceasefire and contin-
ued thereafter.488 These discussions broke down over Iraq's insistence that it 
should control the entire Shatt aI-Arab waterway; neither side was prepared to 
compromise on this issue, and both refused a political solution. However, two 
weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Iraq conceded most Iranian demands, 
agreeing to revert to the 1975 treaty providing for joint sovereignty over the Shatt 
and to return prisoners of war (POW s). These concessions had been Iranian peace 
conditions stated soon after the 1980 Iraqi invasion.489 No major exchanges of 
POWs, mostly captured ground forces but undoubtedly including naval person-
nel, came until 10 years later.490 
Iran announced on August 20 it would continue inspecting vessels during the 
ceasefire; this was a largely theoretical gesture,491 although Iraq protested it.492 
The commitment of the European naval force was extended to clear 2000 mines 
from the northern Gulf and the Shatt aI-Arab after the ceasefire. Operation 
Cleansweep has been hailed as the "culmination of a major pioneering landmark in 
European naval co-operation." There had been no coordination of merchant ship 
protection among WEU navies, however.493 The United States announced the end 
of escorted convoy operations in the Gulf in October 1988, although US forces 
would be positioned to act if US-flagged vessels were directly threatened.494 Later 
this was replaced by a monitoring system.49S In January 1989 "deflagging" proce-
dures for reverting the tankers to the Kuwaiti ensign began.496 In March 1990 the 
last US Navy minesweepers came home.497 Increased US naval presence in the 
Gulf, resulting in over 100 convoys, was considered an "unqualified success;,,498 
other participating States gave their operations high marks.499 Iraq, deeply in debt 
to several Western States, Japan and the USSR, declared victory, and Iran felt 
skeptical relief, at the end ofhostilities.SOO 
Part C. Conclusions 
"The Iran-Iraq conflict was a major war, not a small war. For the only time since 
\Vorld War II, deliberate and sustained operations were carried out against mer-
chant ships" by the belligerents.SOl It was also one of the longest wars of the cen-
tury, with a million casualties, mostly in the land campaigns.S02 Perhaps virtually 
every Iraqi family lost a son, brother or father,S03 or 150,000 killed among 400,000 
casualties. An entire generation lost a decade of its life, and the country had only 
begun to face the social costs it would have to pay.S04 For Iran, the war brought dis-
illusionment and moderation in its Islamic fundamentalism and perhaps 300,000 
dead.sos Direct and indirect economic costs ofthe war to Iran and Iraq came to 
about $1.2 trillion, plus another $1.1 trillion to rebuild their economies. "The total 
cost of the war exceed[ ed] the oil revenue of the two States throughout the 
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twentieth century.,,506 Iraq's booming prewar economy and rapid economic devel-
opment may have been set back two decades, and a large non-Arab debt remained 
to slow economic recovery.507 Iraq's foreign debt stood at $65 billion in 1985, with 
perhaps half owed GCC States; it had ballooned to $100 billion at the war's end.508 
Iraq's only positive gain may have been in its armed forces; its ground forces were 
five times larger with 955,000 effectives at the war's end; by 1988 Iraq had doubled 
its available tanks and aircraft. 509 Nearly all of the increase in military hardware 
was due to Soviet aid.510 Counting reserves, Iraq had nearly all the working popu-
lation of the country under arms.511 Iran also increased its total active military 
manpower, mostly in ground forces, but its mechanized units, combat aircraft, 
tanks, artillery and naval power were reduced considerably by the last years of the 
war.512 
It was a war that resolved nothing, changed little, toppled neither regime, and 
settled none of the underlying issues.513 
... [T]his [was] a war worthy of a place of honour in Barbara Tuchman's March of 
Folly. It will be cited as a classic example of the power of an individual's blind 
dogmatism in totalitarian states to lead a people towards disaster and thereby to 
change history. This occurrence could well repeat itself[,] especially in the prevailing 
instability presided over by autocratic regimes in the Middle East.514 
The 1990-91 Gulf War, beginning with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, began two years 
later515 and proves the point; there may be repetitions in the future. The key lesson 
to be learned from the war, according to Chaim Herzog, then President oflsrael, 
was that no State can survive militarily in isolation. "The nations of the world are 
interdependent, and a major element in any middle and small nation's military ca-
pability must ... be based on its international economic and political standing. 
The ... War proved that this must be a major and vital consideration in the defence 
of any country.,,516 
The war at sea, while relatively less costly in terms of life and less important 
than the land, air and missile campaigns in terms of people involved, was a signifi-
cant part of the conflict. 
1. The Tanker War. 
The Tanker War was the most important aspect of naval warfare during the 
conflict. Sl7 It was the largest loss of merchant ships and mariners' lives since the 
Second World War: 
Throughout the eight year ... War, Iran and Iraq ... attacked more than 400 
commercial vessels, almost all of which were neutral State flag ships. Over 200 
merchant seamen ... lost their lives .... [T]he attacks ... resulted in excess of 40 
million dead weight tons of damaged shipping. Thirty-one of the attacked merchants 
were sunk, and another SO [were] declared total losses. For 1987 alone, the strikes 
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against commercial shipping numbered 178, with a resulting death toll of 108. In 
relative terms, by the end ofl987, write-offlosses in the Gulf War stood at nearly half 
the tonnage of merchant shipping sent to the bottom in World War II. ... [S]hips .. . 
of more than 30 different countries, including ... permanent members of the .. . 
Security Council, [were] subjected to attacks. 
Only about one percent of Gulf voyages involved attacks, however.Sl8 Neverthe-
less, in terms of percentages oflosses due to maritime casualties worldwide, the sta-
tistics were staggering. During 1982, the first year of the Tanker War, 47 percent of 
all Liberian-flag tonnage losses due to maritime casualty worldwide occurred in 
the Gulf. In 1986 the figure was 99 percent; in 1987, more than 90 percent, and the 
final percentages may have gone higher due to marine insurance underwriters' late 
declaration of constructive total losses. Flags of convenience were flown by most 
Gulf tankers, a third being owned by US nationals, with another substantial por-
tion chartered by US nationals. The financial loss to US interests was therefore 
substantial. Insured losses declared by underwriters were heavy, reaching $30 mil-
lion in one month, with resulting tremendous increases in war risk premiums. The 
total cost of conducting the war, and the direct and indirect damage caused by it, 
was nearly $1.2 trillion. If there were 
any good things that could be said of this conflict, they [were] that the Gulf War 
[became] the principal factor in reducing the overtonnage of the world oil tanker fleet 
and in aiding a recovery of the tanker market, and ... tremendous advances in marine 
firefighting equipment and techniques [were] directly attributable to recent 
experience in the Gulf. 
To a US government expert, "this [was] too thin a silver lining to justify the 
cloud."SI9 Iran attacked ships of more than 32 national flags, while Iraq mostly 
concentrated on vessels flagged or chartered by Iran. Iraq concentrated on attack-
ing ships within Iran's war zone, while Iran mostly attacked vessels in the lower 
Gulf, outside its or Iraq's zones. Iraq tended to shoot first and identify later, while 
Iran conducted careful vessel reconnaissance and specific vessel identification. 
Iraq used aircraft for its strikes, while Iran employed conventional aircraft, heli-
copters, surface combatants and small boats, the latter manned by Revolutionary 
Guard forces. S20 Iraq never caused a major interruption in Iran's exports to finance 
its war.S2I 
Several warships-US frigates Samuel B. Roberts and Stark, and major units of 
the belligerents' navies as well as smaller craft like Iran Ajr-were severely dam-
aged or sunk. Some losses resulted from opposing belligerents' attacks, some oc-
curred through mistake, and some through self-defense responses by States not 
party to the conflict. There were deaths and injuries among crews. Belligerents and 
neutrals lost air crews through combat losses or accidents. There were losses of 
personnel at offshore terminals and other oil facilities. These facilities, including 
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some in territories of neutral States, were also damaged. Attacks on oil platforms 
resulted in deaths, injuries, and material destruction. The Vincennes tragedy 
caused 290 deaths.522 These losses do not include those incurred during the land 
campaigns.523 
One interesting result of the war was reduced use of the Strait of Hormuz as an 
oil lifeline to the West. While tankers lifted nearly 20 million barrels a day through 
the Strait in 1978, this had been reduced to 6.4 billion in 1985. Oil discoveries out-
side the Gulf, pipelines from Iraq through Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and the Sau-
dis' construction of an east-west pipeline with capacity of 3.2-5 million barrels a 
day may be "insurance-in case the Strait ... is closed." These developments may 
inhibit skyrocketing oil prices if there are more political-military developments in 
the region.524 Yet another factor is increased production from other oil fields, e.g., 
the North Sea. 
2. The Marine Environment. 
The environment was also a loser, a major casualty to the Gulfbeing the 1983 
Nowruz attack.525 Undoubtedly attacks on other terminals and offshore oil facili-
ties caused spills.526 And undoubtedly attacks on loaded tankers and other vessels, 
ships in ballast and warships, resulted in loss of cargoes, primarily petroleum, and 
bunkers.527 Aircraft losses likely spread sheens on the Gulf.528 Apart from the 
Nowruz spill, there is no indication that States considered the impact of military 
activity on the environment or the developing law protecting it.529 Completion of 
overland oil pipelines530 may reduce risk of pollution at sea in the Gulf, but these 
pipelines are vulnerable to attack by any number of methods (particularly if laid 
close to the shore) during war or accidents at any time. Pipeline construction has 
only shifted the environmental risk to the land. 
3. The Role of the United States and the Soviet Union. 
In terms of US policy, it has been said that 
By playing a leading role in the Gulf as well as in the United Nations, the United 
States unquestionably helped bring Iran to the negotiating table ... U.S. policy 
helped reestablish U.S. credibility among the Gulf Arab States by demonstrating that 
the United States could sustain a low-key, politically sensitive, and consistent 
military policy .... U.S. military planners were quite pleased with the ... cooperation 
they enjoyed from Gulf States normallyreluctantto be so forthcoming .... U.S. policy 
"kept the Soviets out of the Gulf" in any significant operational sense, while U.S. 
policymakers nonetheless worked successfully with the Soviets in the United 
Nations in forging Resolution 598. All these produced ... satisfaction among U.S. 
diplomats involved in the year's [1988's] events . 
. . . [T]he United States shared credit for bringing the cease-fire into effect with a 
wide range of factors. Iraq's extended bombing campaign, of which the tanker war 
was but a minor part, slowly ground Iran's economy down to crisis levels by the end of 
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1987, and Iran's efforts to deal with its economy only exacerbated deep fissures 
among competing political factions in Tehran. Economic deprivation combined 
with battlefield stalemate to produce ... war weariness across Iran .... The "war of the 
cities" provoked confusion and fear out of all proportion to the relatively meager 
physical damage .... In some sense, Iraq can be said to have won its war with Iran. 
Luck also played a role.531 Other factors that might be mentioned, at least in the 
context of the Tanker War, included cooperation of the Gulf States and US NATO 
allies and other States affected by the war's dislocations and attacks on their ship-
ping. The overwhelming supply of arms and other goods to Iraq also was a major 
factor.532 However, "[i]t should now be clear that US involvement in the Gulf dur-
ing the ... War, particularly during the ... 'tanker war' ... was part of along-stand-
ing continuum of American foreign policy.,,533 
The USSR tried to achieve several goals: preserving its influence in Iraq, gain-
ing influence in the GCC and Iran, and reducing US influence in the region,e.g., by 
chartering tankers to Kuwait. The war bolstered Soviet standing in the region. At 
war's end Iraq could not afford to alienate the USSR or end its dependence on So-
viet arms supplies. Iran would have to improve its relations with the Soviet Union 
to encourage the USSR to moderate its support ofIraq. While the Gulf States were 
much less dependent on the Soviet Union, they were not anxious to see the USSR 
leave the Gulf after the war; Soviet presence was seen as useful to keep the United 
States concerned about the region. Soviet post-war gains were therefore not signif-
icant. With the war over, there were fewer opportunities and greater obstacles for 
extending Soviet political and military influence in the Gulf.534 The USSR's dis-
integration three years later of course meant loss of whatever gains it had made 
during the war. Iraq lost an arms supplier, Iran lost a whipping boy,535 and the 
other Gulf States lost a makeweight. The Soviet Union's demise meant a triumph 
of US policy, and just in time for the 1990-91 GulfWar.536 
4. The Role of International Organizations. 
The United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, emerged from Cold 
War gridlock to a more active role in peacemaking. Its resolutions affirming free-
dom of navigation are particularly important for this analysis.537 The Arab 
League, at first gridlocked because of divisions among its members, some of whom 
(e.g., Syria) supported Iran and others Iraq (e.g., Kuwait, Saudi Arabia), came to-
gether at the end of the war.538 States in other established international organiza-
tions, e.g., individual NATO members, cooperated together more or less under the 
WEU with Persian Gulf States to support freedom of navigation. WEU's revital-
ization has been traced to the Tanker War shipping threat.539 These European 
States, while following a Western political strategy, were able to distinguish them-
selves from US policy. They made separate, if not radically different, defmitions of 
Western interests in the Gulf. Deployment of European naval power to the Gulf 
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improved the status of European States with many Gulf Cooperation Council 
members, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.540 
The European Community, evolving into the European Union during the war 
years, and the Economic Summits lent diplomatic pressure to end the conflict.541 
Nevertheless, it appeared likely that although the EU will harmonize policies in 
Europe, European States will muddle through with individual policies in the Gulf 
in the future.542 
However, the most impressive development during 1980-88 was the organiza-
tion of the Gulf Cooperation Council of other Gulf States in 1981, which by war's 
end could "have good reasons for being pleased and confident .... They ... success-
fully weathered the Iranian revolution, eight years of Iran-Iraq fighting, and a 
whole range of direct or covert Iranian efforts to undermine them. They [could] 
reasonably argue that the future [could] not be worse than the recent past.,,543 It 
has been correctly predicted that 
... [T]he Gee states will strive to maintain their unity to limit the chances of 
turmoil spreading from one state to the rest. Together, they will try to hew a middle 
path between Iran and Iraq ... to achieve a balance of power in the Gulf and limit the 
opportunities for super-power intervention .... Because the Gee states can never 
attain an even mildly formidable ... defense posture, their attention is properly 
focused on diplomacy. Nevertheless, practical steps toward closer security 
cooperation ... can serve to deny the attractions of outside meddling in the affairs of 
the weaker members of the community, and put the larger powers on notice that the 
Gee states are det~rmined to act together to preserve their political integrity.544 
For the United States, a problem could be military equipment purchases from 
other countries, thereby lessening dependence on America while increasing de-
pendence on other States.545 
5. The Ensuing Chapters. 
From any perspective the Tanker War was costly in terms of people, property, 
pollution of the environment, and perhaps international law. The Chapters that 
follow analyze the war in the context of the UN Charter, and in particular the in-
herent right ofindividual and collective self-defense in Article 51 ;546 the law of the 
sea in the con text of the Persian Gulf;547 the law of naval warfare, apart from Char-
ter considerations, at stake in the Tanker War;548 and the law of the sea, the law of 
the maritime environment, and the law of naval warfare.549 
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